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HOW FAR DO THE LAWLESS AREAS OF EUROPE
EXTEND? EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF
THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS 
TARIK ABDEL-MONEM*
In February of 2004, former Chechen President Zelimkhan
Yandarbiyev was killed in Doha, Qatar, when his car was detonated
by an explosive device.1 Local authorities later arrested three
alleged Russian intelligence agents for his death, one of them
holding a diplomatic passport.2 Two of the men admitted to being
members of Russian intelligence services, and reported that the
explosive used to kill Yandarbiyev was smuggled into Qatar
through a diplomatic pouch.3 A U.S. official later stated that the
arrests of the Russian agents were made with assistance to Qatar
by the United States.4 After a diplomatic row between Russia and
Qatar, the two suspects were tried and found guilty by a Qatari
court, marking “the first time in recent history that a court has
found that Russia, a key U.S. ally in the war on terrorism, itself
employed terrorist tactics on foreign soil to eliminate one of its
enemies.”5
Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev’s assassination should not be treated as
an isolated event. In an era characterized by increased military
intervention abroad, international courts should be prepared to
Abdel-Monem in Journal of Transnational Law and Policy (2004-2005) 14(2). 
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address claims of human rights violations committed by state actors
in foreign territories. The principle question in such inquiries,
however, is to what extent human rights treaty obligations extend
beyond the territorial jurisdiction of states acting on foreign soil.
This article examines the role of the European Convention on
Human Rights, arguably one of the most important international
human rights agreements, in addressing claims of human rights
violations by member-states to the Convention committed on the
soil of nations not party to the Convention. The Convention’s
judiciary body — the European Court of Human Rights — has
developed important precedents regarding alleged human rights
violations committed in non-Convention nations and continues to
grapple with the issue of the extraterritorial application of the
Convention abroad. Most notably, the Court issued rulings in
Bankoviƒ and Others v. Belgium and 16 Other Contracting States,
involving the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia, and Öcalan v. Turkey,
concerning the Turkish abduction of a Kurdish leader in Kenya,
which speak to the Convention’s applicability to state actions in
foreign nations. 
This article proceeds as follows: Part I-A provides an overview
of the European Convention on Human Rights — Europe’s regional
treaty protecting fundamental human rights and freedoms since its
inception following the Second World War. Parts I-B and I-C,
respectively, outline characteristics of the Convention’s judicial
body, the European Court of Human Rights, and its executive body,
the Committee of Ministers, which is charged with enforcing rulings
of the Court on member-states to the Convention. Part II provides
a general outline of considerations of extraterritorial jurisdiction for
state actors abroad.
Part III analyzes the European Court of Human Rights’ ruling
in Bankoviƒ, in which citizens of Yugoslavia sued NATO for deaths
caused by the bombing of a television station during Operation
Allied Force. It provides, in Part III-A, a background to NATO
intervention in Kosovo and, in Part III-B, a review of the plaintiff’s
argument that the European Convention applied to NATO actions
in Yugoslavia — which at the time was not a member-state to the
Convention. Those arguments relied on the Court’s case law in: 1)
Loizidou v. Cyprus and Cyprus v. Turkey — in which Turkey was
found to have an obligation to uphold the Convention in areas of
Cyprus under military occupation because of its exertion of effective
control in those areas; 2) recent admissibility decisions in IlaÕcu
and Others v. Moldova and Russia; and 3) Issa and Others v.
Turkey, concerning military operations by member-states to the
Convention in foreign nations. Parts III-C and III-D outline the
respondent governments’ arguments, and the Court’s ruling in
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Bankoviƒ, respectively, in which it found that NATO countries did
not have an obligation to adhere to the Convention. Part IV-A
reviews the 2003 case of Öcalan v. Turkey – involving the abduction
of Abdullah Öcalan by Turkish security forces at Nairobi
International Airport, and Part IV-B reviews the Court’s ruling —
in contrast to Bankoviƒ — that Turkey’s actions in Kenya triggered
the Convention’s jurisdiction because of its effective control over
Öcalan vis-à-vis his arrest and detention. 
Parts V-X provide the bulk of this article’s analyses, by
indicating how European Court of Human Right’s case law may
apply to human rights violations committed abroad. Part V
examines the state of the European Court of Human Rights’
doctrine on extraterritorial application in the wake of Bankoviƒ,
Öcalan, and related cases. It argues that the Convention does apply
to member-states acting abroad if its operations are characterized
by effective control. Part VI reviews the recent adoption of the
European Convention on Human Rights into the United Kingdom’s
jurisprudence through its passage of the Human Rights Act 1998.
This development is significant, as suits have recently been filed
against the United Kingdom for human rights violations committed
by British military forces in Iraq alleging violations of the European
Convention. Part VII specifically outlines the case of Baha Mousa,
who was allegedly tortured with other Iraqis and killed by British
military personnel while in their custody. Mousa’s case, along with
other complaints, has been filed before the High Court of England
and Wales in the aforementioned suits against the United Kingdom.
Part VIII proceeds to examine the European Court’s treatment
of mistreatment and torture claims of persons in state custody in
the cases of Ireland v. The United Kingdom, Tomasi v. France,
Ribitsch v. Austria, and Selmouni v. France, in which the Court has
found member-states to the Convention in violation of its
prohibition against torture and inhuman treatment. Part IX begins
with an analysis of McCann and Others v. The United Kingdom, in
which the British government was found to have violated the
Convention’s protection of the fundamental right to life in the
killings of Irish Republican Army suspects in Gibraltar. It also
reviews the Court’s case law on the “disappearance” cases of Çakici
v. Turkey and Timurtaº v. Turkey, in which the Court held that the
unacknowledged detentions and deaths of Kurdish separatists by
Turkish security forces also amounted to violations of the
Convention’s right to life, and Velikova v. Bulgaria, in which the
Court found a violation of the right to life of an individual detained
by Bulgarian police.
Part X concludes this Article with an argument that the United
Kingdom should be liable for the death of Baha Mousa and other
162 J. TRANSNATIONAL LAW & POLICY [Vol. 14:2
6. See STEFAN KIRCHNER, THE ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN TIMES
OF CONFLICT, at http://www.sarigiannidis.gr/articles/Kirchner_articleECtHR.PDF (last
visited Feb. 25, 2005) (“[N]ow that the first cases relating to the conflicts in Kurdistan and
Chechnya are being dealt with by the E.C.H.R., it has been estimated that up to 100,000 new
cases could reach [the European Court of Human Rights] every year.”). See also Press
Release, Registrar of the European Court of Human Rights, Six Complaints Against Russia
Concerning Events in Chechnya Declared Admissible (Jan. 16, 2003), at http://www.echr.coe.
int (last visited Feb. 25, 2005) (announcing in 2003 the admissibility of the first six claims
brought by Chechens for alleged human rights violations committed in Chechnya by the
Russian military in 1999 and 2000). 
7. COUNCIL OF EUROPE, MANUAL OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE: STRUCTURE, FUNCTIONS
AND ACHIEVEMENTS 3 (1970) [hereinafter MANUAL] (discussing the creation of the Council
of Europe by statute). See also PETER M. R. STIRK, A HISTORY OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION
SINCE 1914 103 (1996) [hereinafter HISTORY OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION] (noting that the
specific proposal behind the Council of Europe’s formation came from French Foreign
Minister Georges Bidault, who advocated for the creation of a European Assembly in 1948).
8. See A.H. ROBERTSON, EUROPEAN INSTITUTIONS: CO-OPERATION, INTEGRATION,
UNIFICATION 4-5 (2d ed. 1966) (outlining the formative history of the Council of Europe and
importance of a “need for European unity”). See also Statute of the Council of Europe, May
5, 1949, art. 1(a), Europ. T.S. No. 1 [hereinafter Statute] (stating that “[t]he aim of the
Council of Europe is to achieve a greater unity between its members for the purpose of
safeguarding and realising the ideals and principles which are their common heritage and
facilitating their economic and social progress”).
9. See Diana Pinto, The Council of Europe: Its Missions and Its Structures, in THE
CHALLENGES OF A GREATER EUROPE: THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE AND DEMOCRATIC SECURITY
29, 29 (1996) (denoting the “basic functions” of the Council of Europe). See also Walter
Schwimmer, Statements Made at the Opening Session (Nov. 3, 2000), in EUROPEAN
MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND COMMEMORATIVE CEREMONY OF THE 50TH
alleged human rights violations committed in Iraq based on
previous European Court of Human Rights case law. However,
Mousa’s case should not be considered the endpoint of an
examination of the European Convention on Human Rights’
extraterritorial application. The Court is now placed to review
numerous claims of human rights violations originating from recent
and ongoing conflicts, as it has and is continuing to do with cases
regarding Turkey’s 1990s operations against Kurdish separatists
and Russia’s continuing conflict in Chechnya.6 In an era in which
international military intervention may continue to occur for an
unforeseeable amount of time, an examination of extraterritorial
obligations to protect fundamental human rights in “lawless areas”
of conflict is warranted. 
I-A.  THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE AND EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS
The Council of Europe was created in May of 1949.7 The
principal motivation for developing the Council was to create a Pan-
European association in the wake of the Second World War.8 The
Council’s overriding mission was to protect democratic values and
human rights.9 At its inception, the Council restricted membership
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ANNIVERSARY OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 13, 15 (2000) (“The Council
of Europe has changed into a more political and operational organisation. One thing has not
changed: the protection of human rights is and remains at the heart of its mission.”).
10. MANUAL, supra note 7, at 3 (listing the original ten members of the Council of Europe).
11. Statute, supra note 8, at pmbl. See also MANUAL, supra note 7, at 8 (discussing the
meaning of the “values” shared by the original member states and proposing that these
values emanate from the “cumulative influence of Greek philosophy, Roman law, the
Western Christian Church, [and] the humanism of the Renaissance and the French
Revolution”).
12. See Pinto, supra note 9, at 29 (listing original members of the Council).
13. DONNA GOMIEN ET AL., LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS AND THE EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER 17-19 (1996) (outlining the general history and
framework of the European Convention on Human Rights).
14. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
November 4, 1950, pmbl., Europ. T.S. No. 5 [hereinafter Convention for Human Rights],
available at http://www.echr.coe.int/Convention/webConvenENG.pdf (last visited Feb. 28,
2005).
15. See Pinto, supra note 9, at 34 (asserting that the Council “derives its strength from the
more than 155 conventions it has concluded over the years, the oldest and most important
of which is the European Convention on Human Rights”). 
16. See Convention for Human Rights, supra note 14, art. 1 (“The High Contracting
Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in
. . . this Convention.”). See also GOMIEN, supra note 13, at 18 (discussing the Convention and
noting the “compulsory jurisdiction” of the Convention and Court of Human Rights); Heinrich
Klebes, Membership in International Organizations and National Constitutional Law: A Case
Study of the Law and Practice of the Council of Europe, ST. LOUIS-WARSAW TRANSATLANTIC
L.J. 69, 76 (1999) (noting that a new Council of Europe member must sign the Convention
at the same time they formally sign the treaty joining the Council).
17. Colloquium, In our hands:  The effectiveness of human rights protection 50 years after
the Universal Declaration, EUROPEAN REGIONAL COLLOQUY ORGANISED BY THE COUNCIL OF
to ten West European nations:  Belgium, Denmark, France, Ireland,
Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the
United Kingdom.10 In the Statute of the Council of Europe, it was
these nations that deemed themselves devoted “to the spiritual and
moral values which are the common heritage of their peoples and
the true source of individual freedom, political liberty and the rule
of law, principles which form the basis of all genuine democracy.”11
Because of the fundamental requirement of democratic governance
for membership, the Soviet Union and Soviet-bloc nations were not
originally included in the Council.12
Shortly after the creation of the Council, it adopted the
European Convention on Human Rights in 1950.13 The Convention
enshrines “fundamental freedoms which are the foundation of
justice and peace.”14 It was the first convention passed by the
Council, and regarded by some as its most important.15 Since it has
been in force, all member-states of the Council of Europe must
ratify the Convention to be a Council member.16 Many of the rights
and protections in the Convention are similar to those found in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, passed two years prior to
the Convention.17 Major rights and protections in the European
164 J. TRANSNATIONAL LAW & POLICY [Vol. 14:2
EUROPE 17 (1998) (statement of Daniel Tarschys, Secretary General of the Council of Europe)
(“As you know, much of our European human rights protection system was inspired by and
is deeply indebted to the Universal Declaration.”). Many of the protections found in the
Convention are also found in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. See Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A(III), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., art. 3, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/810 (1948) (right to life, liberty and security); id. art. 4 (prohibition of slavery); id. art.
7 (prohibition of discrimination).
18. Convention for Human Rights, supra note 14, art. 2.
19. Id. art. 5.
20. Id. art. 6.
21. Id. art. 9.
22. Id. art. 10.
23. Id. art. 3.
24. Id. art. 4.
25. Id. art. 14.
26. See GOMIEN, supra note 13, at 18 (outlining several of the additional protocols that
have been made to the Convention).
27. Convention for Human Rights, supra note 14, art. 19 (“To ensure the observance of the
engagements undertaken by the High Contracting Parties in the Convention and the
Protocols thereto, there shall be set up a European Court of Human Rights, hereinafter
referred to as ‘the Court.’ It shall function on a permanent basis.”).
28. Id.
29. Id. art. 1 (“The High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their
jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section I of this Convention.”); id. art. 32(1)
(“The jurisdiction of the Court shall extend to all matters concerning the interpretation and
application of the Convention and the protocols thereto . . . .”); id. art. 32(2) (“In the event of
dispute as to whether the Court has jurisdiction, the Court shall decide.”); id. art. 46(1) (“The
High Contracting Parties undertake to abide by the final judgment of the Court in any case
to which they are parties.”). 
Convention include the right to life,18 right to liberty and security,19
right to fair trial,20 right to freedom of thought, conscience and
religion,21 right to freedom of expression,22 prohibition of torture,23
prohibition of slavery,24 and prohibition of discrimination.25 Since
its inception, a number of changes and protocols have been made to
the Convention, although its fundamental nature has remained
unchanged.26 The major operational organs of the Convention
include the European Court of Human Rights and Committee of
Ministers.
I-B.  THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
The European Court of Human Rights is the judicial body which
interprets the European Convention on Human Rights for the
Council of Europe.27 The European Court of Human Rights was
created in tandem with the Convention as its judicial decision-
making body.28 The potency of the Court is primarily due to two
aspects. First, the Court retains compulsory jurisdiction over all
Council of Europe members.29 Secondly, the Court allows
individuals, as well as states, to petition the Court directly for relief
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30. Id. art. 34 (“The Court may receive applications from any person, non-governmental
organisation or group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the High
Contracting Parties . . . .”). 
31. Protocol No. 11 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, restructuring the control machinery established thereby, May 11,
1994, pmbl., Europ. T.S. No. 155, available at http://conventions.coe.int (last visited Feb. 28,
2005).
32. EUROPAWORLD, HUMAN RIGHTS AND EUROPE’S WRONGS (Oct. 11, 2000), at http://www.
europaworld.org (last visited Feb. 28, 2005).
33. THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE, THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE’S MEMBER STATES (2004), at http:/
/www.coe.int (last visited Feb. 28, 2005). Current members include Albania, Andorra,
Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus,
Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary,
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Moldova,
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, San Marino, Serbia
and Montenegro, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, “The former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia,” Turkey, Ukraine, and the United Kingdom. Id.  See also GOMIEN, supra note 13,
at 33.
34. Convention for Human Rights, supra note 14, art. 23 (“The judges shall be elected for
a period of nine years.”); GOMIEN, supra note 13, at 34 (noting that the first actual election
occurred several years after the Court was created in 1959).
35. Convention for Human Rights, supra note 14, art. 27 (stating size of review bodies);
id. art. 30 (stating that the Grand Chamber meets when there is a “serious question affecting
the interpretation of the Convention”).
36. See A New Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, in THE CHALLENGES OF A GREATER
EUROPE: THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE AND DEMOCRATIC SECURITY 81, 81 (1996) (outlining
procedures by which applications to the Court are first reviewed for admissibility).
37. See Convention for Human Rights, supra note 14, art. 35(4) (“The Court shall reject
any application which it considers inadmissible under this Article. It may do so at any stage
of the proceedings.”).
38. Id. art. 35(1).
from alleged violations.30 These principles of the Convention were
enshrined by Protocol Number 11 to the Convention, signed in 1994
and in force since 1998.31 Together, these principles make the
Convention, through the Court, an “essential Bill of Rights” for
Europe.32
The number of judges in the Court is equal to the number of
Council of Europe member-states, which, as of 2004, was forty-
five.33 Judges are elected into office for six-year terms by the
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.34 Ordinarily, to
decide a case, the Court meets in a Committee of three judges, a
Chamber of seven judges, or in the case of an extraordinarily
important issue, a Grand Chamber of seventeen judges.35
However, for a case to be admissible, it is first reviewed by a
judge-rapporteur and committee of three judges.36 If deemed
inadmissible, the Court may dispose of the case at any time.37
Criteria for admissibility include several major requirements. First,
the Court may only review cases “after all domestic remedies have
been exhausted.”38 This requirement is based on the well-accepted
principle of international law that states must first have an
166 J. TRANSNATIONAL LAW & POLICY [Vol. 14:2
39. GOMIEN, supra note 13, at 55 (noting that the requirement to exhaust domestic
remedies is based on a “general principle of international law”); A.H. ROBERTSON & J.G.
MERRILLS, HUMAN RIGHTS IN EUROPE: A STUDY OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS 265 (1993) [hereinafter ROBERTSON & MERRILLS, HUMAN RIGHTS IN EUROPE] (noting
that the requirement to exhaust domestic remedies is based on “[a] well-established part of
international law . . . . [I]t would be unjust to engage the international responsibility of a
State for an act or omission when a national means of redress is available but has not been
used.”).
40. Jurisprudence has developed in this area in regards to Turkey’s war against Worker’s
Party of Kurdistan (PKK) separatists. In Akdivar v. Turkey, applicants sued the government
for destroying property in an anti-PKK operation. Akdivar v. Turkey, 1996-IV Eur. Ct. H.R.
1192, 1199. Although the government alleged that they had not yet exhausted domestic
remedies, the Court noted that there were “special circumstances” that waived this
requirement. Id. at 1211. In particular, the Court noted difficulty in gathering evidence and
pursuing a claim because that region of Southeast Turkey was basically in a state of war. Id.
at 1211-12. The Court also noted that facts of the case indicated a “clear reluctance” of the
government to investigate acts of its own soldiers against the Kurdish population. Id. at
1209. In Kiliç v. Turkey, the applicant sued the government for the assassination of a
Kurdish human rights worker. Kiliç v. Turkey, 2000-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 75, 83-84. The Court
found that Turkey had not fulfilled its obligation to investigate the act and provide a remedy
to the applicant because it had “permitted or fostered a lack of accountability of members of
the security forces for their actions.” Id. at 99. The government’s inability to provide a
domestic remedy, even in a wartime situation, was in itself found to be a violation of the
Convention. Id. at 103.
41. Convention for Human Rights, supra note 14, art. 35 (1) (“The Court may only deal
with the matter after all domestic remedies have been exhausted . . . and within a period of
six months from the date on which the decision was taken.”).
42. GOMIEN, supra note 13, at 59 (discussing different circumstances in which the six-
month period begins).
43. Convention for Human Rights, supra note 14, art. 35 (3).
44. ROBERTSON & MERRILLS, HUMAN RIGHTS IN EUROPE, supra note 39, at 272 (asserting
that an application is “doomed to fail” if it alleges non-covered rights, such as a “right to
asylum” or a “right not to be extradited”).
opportunity to provide relief to the claim domestically.39 However,
there are of course exceptions to this requirement, most notably
involving situations in which pursuing a claim domestically would
be difficult or impossible given wartime situations.40 Second, an
applicant must file a claim with the Court within six months of the
date in which a domestic decision was finalized.41 The six-month
period begins not only when the decision is issued, but when the
applicant becomes aware of that decision.42 
A third requirement, particular to individual applicants, is that
a case will be deemed inadmissible if found to be “incompatible with
the provisions of the Convention or the protocols thereto, [or]
manifestly ill-founded.”43 The difference between the first and
second item is slight. A case will be deemed incompatible with the
Convention if the act or omission raised by the applicant does not
speak to a protected right enumerated in it.44 On the other hand, a
case which does speak to a protected right under the Convention
will be deemed ill-founded if not found to be a prima facie
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45. See id. at 272-73 (quoting Felix Ermacora, Rights of Minorities and Self-Determination
in the Framework of the CSCE, in THE HUMAN DIMENSION OF THE HELSINKI PROCESS: THE
VIENNA FOLLOW-UP MEETING AND ITS AFTERMATH 197 (Arie Bloed and Pieter van Dijk eds..
1991)).
46. Id. at 273.
47. Convention for Human Rights, supra note 14, art. 35(2)(b).
48. See Elizabeth F. Defeis, Human Rights and the European Union: Who Decides?
Possible Conflicts Between the European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human
Rights, 19 DICK. J. INT’L L. 301, 302-317 (2001) (discussing the gradual integration of human
rights into community law of the European Union); id. at 329 (concluding that “[w]ithout
question, the European Union will play an increasingly important role in the area of human
rights, both in its external and internal policies”). See also SALVATORE ZAPPALÀ, HUMAN
RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 10-14 (Ian Brownlie & Vaughan Lowe
eds., 2003) (discussing systemic intricacies between the European Court of Human Rights,
European Court of Justice, and International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia);
Jonathan Miller, A European Bill of Rights?, in THE HARMONIZATION OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC
POLICY: REGIONAL RESPONSES TO TRANSNATIONAL CHALLENGES 219, 221-33 (Leon Hurwitz
ed., 1983) (discussing the increasing willingness of the European Court of Justice to broaden
its human rights framework in tandem with the European Court of Human Rights); Gerard
Quinn, The European Union and the Council of Europe on the Issue of Human Rights: Twins
Separated at Birth?, 46 MCGILL L.J. 849, 851-54 (2001) (outlining general issues pertinent
to the European Union’s increasing human rights agenda).  
49. See GOMIEN, supra note 13, at 61-62 (discussing implications of raising claims in either
or both the European Court of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights); ROBERTSON & MERRILLS, HUMAN RIGHTS IN EUROPE, supra note 39, at 274
(discussing both forums, and noting the possibility of “appealing” a decision from the Court
of Human Rights to the Covenant’s Human Rights Committee). For a general comparison
of application procedures of the European Court of Human Rights and the Human Rights
Committee, see Rein Müllerson, The Efficiency of the Individual Complaint Procedures: The
Experience of CCPR, CERD, CAT and ECHR, in MONITORING HUMAN RIGHTS IN EUROPE:
COMPARING INTERNATIONAL PROCEDURES AND MECHANISMS 25 (Arie Bloed et al. eds., 1993).
50. GOMIEN, supra note 13, at 61 (noting that “‘no new relevant information’ . . .
encompasses only facts that were not known at the time of the previous application or have
occurred since the [Court] disposed of the matter”).
51. Convention for Human Rights, supra note 14, art. 38(1)(b) (“If the Court declares the
application admissible, it shall . . . place itself at the disposal of the parties concerned with
a view to securing a friendly settlement of the matter on the basis of respect for human
violation.45 The “clearest situation [of an ill-founded application] is
when the applicant fails to adduce any evidence in support of his
claim.”46 The final major requirement of admissibility is that an
application has not “already been submitted to another procedure
of international investigation or settlement and contains no
relevant new information.”47 This requirement has become more
relevant given the development of other international mechanisms
to address alleged human rights violations, such as the European
Court of Justice48 and the Human Rights Committee of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.49 “No relevant
new information” is considered to be facts that were not known
when the original application was submitted.50
Upon a finding that an application is admissible, review on the
merits begins. The Court must first attempt to find a “friendly
settlement” between parties.51 If a settlement can be achieved, the
168 J. TRANSNATIONAL LAW & POLICY [Vol. 14:2
rights.”).
52. Id. art. 39 (“If a friendly settlement is effected, the Court shall strike the case out of
its list.”).
53. ROBERTSON & MERRILLS, HUMAN RIGHTS IN EUROPE, supra note 39, at 282 (discussing
the increasing incidence of friendly settlements and estimating that one in seven cases are
resolved in this manner).
54. GOMIEN, supra note 13, at 70-71 (discussing the Court’s procedures).
55. D.J. HARRIS ET AL., LAW OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 658 (1995)
(discussing procedures for review of cases).
56. EUR. CT. H.R., RULE 34(6), available at http://www.echr.coe.int (last visited Feb. 28,
2005).
57. Id. RULE 63(1-3) (outlining the “public character of hearings”).
58. Id. RULE 22(1) (“The Court shall deliberate in private. Its deliberations shall remain
secret.”).
59. Id. RULE 23(1) (“The decisions of the Court shall be taken by a majority of the judges
present. In the event of a tie, a fresh vote shall be taken and, if there is still a tie, the
President shall have a casting vote.”).
60. Convention for Human Rights, supra note 14, art. 41.
61. HARRIS, supra note 55, at 686-87 (discussing pecuniary damages upon finding of a
Convention violation).
62. Statute, supra note 8, art. 13 (“The Committee of Ministers is the organ which acts on
behalf of the Council of Europe.”).
63. Id. art. 14 (“Representatives on the Committee shall be the Ministers for Foreign
Affairs.”). In actuality, representatives of Foreign Affairs Ministers are the individuals who
do much of the Committee’s work. See ROBERTSON & MERRILLS, HUMAN RIGHTS IN EUROPE,
supra note 39, at 324.
case is then removed from the Court.52 The finding of friendly
settlements has become increasingly common, with one estimation
being that one of seven cases are resolved through friendly
settlement.53 If such a settlement cannot be achieved, review
continues, with proceedings scheduled by the Court.54 Arguments
and testimony are conducted in one of the Court’s official languages:
English or French.55 Interpreters are provided for those not
proficient in either language.56 Hearings are generally public, with
certain exceptions depending on circumstances.57 After all
arguments and evidence are offered, the judges deliberate in
private.58 A majority vote amongst the judges is required for final
determination.59 If a violation is found to have occurred, the Court
may then “afford just satisfaction” to the plaintiff.60 Just
satisfaction is monetary and may include payment of legal and
court fees, as well as “damages” that may either be compensatory
in nature or “moral” — awarding a plaintiff for loss and punishing
the actor in breach for violating the Convention.61 
I-C.  THE COMMITTEE OF MINISTERS
The Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers serves as the
executive body for the Council.62 It is composed of the Foreign
Affairs Ministers of each Council member-state.63 The Committee
Spring, 2005]           LAWLESS AREAS OF EUROPE 169
64. Statute, supra note 8, art. 15(a). 
65. Id. art. 15(b) (“In appropriate cases, the conclusions of the Committee may take the
form of recommendations to the governments of members.”).
66. Id. art. 4 (“Any European state which is deemed to be able and willing to fulfill the
provisions of Article 3 may be invited to become a member of the Council of Europe by the
Committee of Ministers.”).
67. Id. art. 8 (“Any member of the Council of Europe which has seriously violated Article
3 may be suspended from its rights of representation [and] the Committee may decide that
it has ceased to be a member of the Council as from such date as the Committee may
determine.”).
68. Id. art. 38(c) (“In accordance with the financial regulations, the budget of the Council
shall be submitted annually by the Secretary General for adoption by the Committee.”).
69. Convention for Human Rights, supra note 14, art. 46(2) (“The final judgment of the
Court shall be transmitted to the Committee of Ministers, which shall supervise its
execution.”).
70. Id. art. 41 (“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the
protocols thereto . . . the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured
party.”).
71. GOMIEN, supra note 13, at 90 (“This supervision may take the form of monitoring
legislative or administrative reforms instituted by states in response to a finding of a
violation, or, in the case of judgments for ‘just satisfaction’ under Article [41], ensuring that
the state has made its payment to the individual.”).
72. Id.
It is important to remember that the Committee of Ministers has no
power to intervene directly in the supervision and execution of
judgments by the offending state in a given case . . . .  Should a state
choose to ignore, or not give full force to a judgment of the Court or a
decision of the Committee of Ministers, there may often be little that
either body can do to persuade the state to respect the holding of the
Strasbourg body.
Id. See also ROBERTSON & MERRILLS, HUMAN RIGHTS IN EUROPE, supra note 39, at 338 (“The
limitations of the Committee are all reflections of its political character and it was, of course,
the desire of the Contracting States to have a political rather than a judicial organ as the
ultimate decision-maker . . . .”).
considers steps necessary to “further the aim of the Council of
Europe, including the conclusion of conventions or agreements and
the adoption by governments of a common policy with regard to
particular matters.”64 Among other things, the Committee may
make recommendations to member-states about policy issues,65
invite states to become new members of the Council,66 terminate
states from Council membership,67 and ratify the Council’s annual
budget.68
In regards to the Convention on Human Rights, the Committee
plays the crucial role of enforcing the decisions of the Court.69 The
Committee might oversee the payment of monetary damages to a
plaintiff upon finding of a Convention violation.70 It might also
monitor a violating member-state’s compliance with the Convention
by amending or reversing a law, administrative act, or judicial
decision.71 However, it should be noted that the Committee cannot
compel a non-complying member to remedy a violation.72 Perhaps
the one power that the Committee does retain to address violations
170 J. TRANSNATIONAL LAW & POLICY [Vol. 14:2
73. Statute, supra note 8, art. 8 (“Any member of the Council of Europe which has
seriously violated Article 3 may be suspended from its rights of representation [and] the
Committee may decide that it has ceased to be a member of the Council as from such date
as the Committee may determine.”).
74. GOMIEN, supra note 13, at 89 (“In the Greek case the Committee of Ministers
considered that a great many Articles of the Convention had been violated. However, before
the Committee adopted its resolution in this case, Greece withdrew from the Council of
Europe and denounced the Convention.”). See also ROBERTSON & MERRILLS, HUMAN RIGHTS
IN EUROPE, supra note 39, at 337-38 (outlining the Greek case and discussing other instances
in which the Committee addressed cases of member-states continually violating the
Convention); Pinto, supra note 9, at 30 (outlining the Council’s strained relationships with
Greece and Turkey following government overthrows, and the severance of ties with
Yugoslavia).
Although Turkey was often cited for its relatively poor human rights record and
strained relationship with the Council of Europe for its war against Kurdish separatists, the
Council’s relationship with Russia has become increasingly difficult in regards to its war in
Chechnya. See RUDOLF BINDIG, COMMITTEE ON LEGAL AFFAIRS AND HUMAN RIGHTS, Doc.
9732: The Human Rights Situation in the Chechen Republic, § II, ¶ 3 (Mar. 13, 2003)
(suggesting that an international war crimes tribunal be created for human rights violations
in Chechnya), available at http://www.europarl.eu.int/meetdocs/delegations/russ/20030409-
Tchechenie/05.pdf (last visited Feb. 28, 2005); Press Release, Council of Europe, Assembly
Gravely Concerned About Human Rights in Chechnya, Puts the Situation Under Its
Constant Review (Jan. 25, 2001) (“[The Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly]
stressed once again that Russia did not act in line with the Council of Europe’s principles and
values in the conduct of its military campaign and that many of the Assembly’s requirements
in this regard are yet to be implemented.”), available at http://press.coe.int (last visited Feb.
28, 2005). 
The European Court of Human Rights has declared admissible, for the first time,
claims against Russia by Chechens allegedly committed during its 1999-2000 war in
Chechnya in January of 2003. Press Release, European Court of Human Rights, Six
Complaints Against Russia Concerning Events in Chechnya Declared Admissible (Jan. 16,
2003), available at http://www.echr.coe.int (last visited Feb. 28, 2005). Those claims are:
Khashiyev v. Russia, App. No. 57942/00 at 12 (2002) (charging Russia with torture,
disappearances, and extrajudicial killings in Grozny), at http://www.echr.coe.int (last visited
Mar. 1, 2005); Isayeva v. Russia, App. No. 57947/00 at 10-11 (2002) (charging Russia with
deaths of civilians following a bombardment of Grozny), at http://www.echr.coe.int (last
visited Mar. 1, 2005); and Isayeva v. Russia, App. No. 57950/00 at 2, 8 (2003) (charging
Russia with deaths of civilians following a bombardment of Katyr-Yurt), at
http://www.echr.coe.int (last visited Mar. 1, 2005).  See Press Release, supra.
75. HARRIS, supra note 55, at 702 (observing that the record of compliance with judgments
by member-states “is generally recognised to be exemplary”).
76. Klebes, supra note 16, at 78 (noting that in the forty year history of the Convention,
the Court has adjudicated approximately 800 judgments, and “[a]ll its decisions have been
respected, though sometimes grudgingly, by the States concerned”).
by a member-state is its most extreme — Article 8 of the
Convention allows the Committee to remove a nation from the
Council of Europe.73  The Committee came close to considering this
option following the 1967 military coup in Greece, but the Greek
government subsequently chose to leave the Council on its own
accord before the Committee could take such action.74
Still, enforcement of judgments against member-states has been
extremely successful.75 Failure to comply with judgments is
virtually non-existent.76 This includes the numerous times the
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77. Austria Violated Rights of Anti-Haider Paper: EU Rights Court, AGENCE FR. PRESSE,
Feb. 26, 2002 (noting a $14,700 fine imposed on Austria for violating free speech rights),
available at LEXIS, European News Sources File; European Human Rights Court Condemns
Turkey in Kurd’s Death, AGENCE FR. PRESSE, Feb. 14, 2002 (noting a $63,100 fine imposed
on Turkey after police tortured a Kurd to death), available at LEXIS, European News
Sources File; Council of Europe Says London Must Allow Elections in Gibraltar, AGENCE FR.
PRESSE, June 26, 2001 (noting a $64,000 fine imposed on the United Kingdom for failing to
secure voting rights for Gibraltar residents), available at LEXIS, European News Sources
File; France Fined by European Court Over Murder Trial of German, AGENCE FR. PRESSE,
Feb. 13, 2001 (noting a $14,000 fine imposed on France for failing to secure trial rights to a
German physician), available at LEXIS, European News Sources File; Cyprus Says It Will
Pay EU Human Rights Fine to Turkish Cypriot, AGENCE FR. PRESSE, Dec. 22, 2000  (noting
a $15,370 fine imposed on Cyprus for maltreatment of a suspected criminal), available at
LEXIS, European News Sources File.
78. Gareth Jenkins, Cloudy Forecast for Turkey, AL-AHRAM WEEKLY ON-LINE (Cairo), June
21–27, 2001 (noting strained relationships between Turkey and the European Union about
its human rights record and an announcement by Turkey’s interior minister that it would
pay the £2.5 million sterling fine), available at http://weekly.ahram.org.eg (last visited Mar.
3, 2005).
79. Georg Ress, The European Convention on Human Rights and States Parties: The Legal
Effect of the Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights on the Internal Law and
Before Domestic Courts of the Contracting States, in PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN
EUROPE: LIMITS AND EFFECTS 209, 256 (Irene Maier ed., 1982) (describing the Federal
Republic of Germany’s pre-emptive amendment to its Code of Criminal Procedure and Code
of the Constitution of Courts to comply with the Court). See also HUMAN RIGHTS: A
CONTINUING CHALLENGE FOR THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE 14 (1995) (noting alteration of laws
or regulations in France, Ireland, Italy, Sweden, Switzerland, and the Netherlands to comply
with the Convention); MANUAL, supra note 7, at 282 (describing instances when Norway
changed its constitution, Belgium changed legislation, and Austria changed its Code of
Criminal Procedure to comply with the Convention).
80. There is, of course, frequent criticism of the effectiveness of the Court and the
Convention. For example, Doris Marie Provine argues that the Convention has not effectively
addressed or conceptualized the problems encountered by half the population of Council of
Europe member-states: women. Doris Marie Provine, Women’s Concerns in the European
Commission and Court on Human Rights, in LAW ABOVE NATIONS: SUPRANATIONAL COURTS
AND THE LEGALIZATION OF POLITICS 76 (Mary L. Volcansek ed., 1997).
Court has ordered member-states to pay monetary compensation to
plaintiffs for Convention violations.77 In 2001, the Court ordered
Turkey to pay a record high of £2.5 million for a military operation
against Kurds that killed fifteen civilians, a payment the Turkish
government agreed to make.78 In other instances, member-states
have gone so far as to change constitutions to comply with Court
rulings, as Germany has done.79 This level of compliance with the
Convention — through a body formed of the Foreign Ministers of all
Council of Europe members — and its compulsory jurisdiction and
ability for individuals to bring suits directly against member-states,
make the Convention an extremely powerful mechanism for
enforcement of human rights.80 
172 J. TRANSNATIONAL LAW & POLICY [Vol. 14:2
81. For a general definition on jurisdiction, see WILLIAM R. SLOMANSON, FUNDAMENTAL
PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 214 (4th ed. 2003) (“The term jurisdiction has several
meanings. It includes the legal capacity or power of a State to (a) establish, (b) enforce, and
(c) adjudicate rules of law within its boundaries.”). See also Vaughan Lowe, Jurisdiction, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW 329, 329 (Malcolm D. Evans ed., 1st ed. 2003) (“‘Jurisdiction’ is the term
that describes the limits of the legal competence of a State or other regulatory authority
(such as the European Community) to make, apply, and enforce rules of conduct upon
persons.”). 
82. SLOMANSON, supra note 81, at 214 (noting the conceptual differences between
“jurisdiction” and “sovereignty” and defining sovereignty as “the exclusive right of a State to
govern the affairs of its inhabitants”).
83. ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 260-62 (2001) (outlining general principles by
which nation-states exert jurisdiction in criminal matters). 
84. SLOMANSON, supra note 81, at 216-22 (discussing the degree of acceptance in
customary international law of jurisdictional principles).
85. Lowe, supra note 81, at 331-33 (discussing a model plan formulated by the Council of
Europe for the categorization of international law documents). The plan is entitled Model
Plan for the Classification of Documents Concerning State Practice in the Field of Public
International Law, Council of Europe Resolution (68) 17 (June 28, 1968). Its latest iteration
is Council of Europe Recommendation No. R (97) 11 (June 12, 1997) [hereinafter Council of
Europe Recommendation], available at http://cm.coe.int/ta/rec/1997/97r11.html (last visited
Mar. 3, 2005). 
86. Council of Europe Recommendation, supra note 85. Terrae nullius or “empty land”
refers to a legal fiction devised during the British colonial era. It justified colonization of
already inhabited areas on the basis that such land was either not inhabited or inhabited by
barbarians. This fiction has since been formally terminated by an Australian decision in
1992. Shelby D. Green, Specific Relief for Ancient Deprivations of Property, 36 AKRON L. REV.
245, 253-65 (2003); Rick Sarre, The Imprisonment of Indigenous Australians: Dilemmas and
II.  JURISDICTION AND EXTRATERRITORIALITY
At a very general level, the framework in which extraterritorial
actions committed by nation-states occur can be examined through
well-accepted principles of jurisdiction.81 Jurisdiction, it should be
noted, differs from the concept of sovereignty.82 On the
international stage, a nation-state exercises jurisdiction over
criminal acts based on principles of territoriality (the act was
committed within the nation-state’s territorial boundaries),
nationality (the act occurred outside the nation-state’s territory but
was committed by a national), or passive nationality (the act
occurred outside the nation-state’s territory but the victim was a
national).83 The territorial principle is the most often cited grounds
for the exercise of jurisdiction — and well-accepted in customary
international law — whereas nationality, and passive nationality,
respectively, are less relied on.84 
In its model classification of international legal documents, the
Council of Europe itself recognizes specific types of extraterritorial
jurisdiction, such as traditionally accepted principles of jurisdiction
over consulates, embassies, and military personnel stationed
abroad.85 It also recognizes “other” forms of extraterritorial
intervention, such as “artificial islands, terrae nullius, etc.”86 The
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Challenges for Policymakers, 4 GEO. PUB. POL'Y REV. 165, 165-69 (1999).  
87. COUNCIL OF EUROPE, EXTRATERRITORIAL CRIMINAL JURISDICTION 9-16 (1990).
88. SLOMANSON, supra note 81, at 222 (“Certain crimes spawn ‘universal interest’ because
they are sufficiently heinous to be crimes against the entire community of nations.”); Lowe,
supra note 81, at 343 (“Some crimes are regarded as so heinous that every State has a
legitimate interest in their repression.”). See also M. Cherif Bassiouni, Universal Jurisdiction
for International Crimes: Historical Perspectives and Contemporary Practice, 42 VA. J. INT’L
L. 81, 96-105 (2001) (providing an overview of the basis for universal jurisdiction); Jonathan
H. Marks, Mending the Web: Universal Jurisdiction, Humanitarian Intervention and the
Abrogation of Immunity by the Security Council, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 445, 463-72
(2004). Marks further distinguishes the rationale for exercising universal jurisdiction into
five sub-categories:  1) The “Manichean Rationale” — the act in question is of such a nature
that its perpetrator is considered an enemy of all humanity; 2) the “Common Interest
Rationale” — the act in question poses a threat to not only one state but all states, which
thus have an interest in suppressing it; 3) the “Agency Rationale” — the act in question has
violated common norms of ius gentium — the law of all nations — thus, a nation-state acts
as an agent of all nations in repressing the act; 4) the “Ius Cogens Rationale” — the act in
question violates a norm of international law so serious that it cannot be permitted and must
be repressed; 5) the “Harm Rationale” — the act in question is so harmful and widespread
(e.g. genocide) that it demands repression; and 6) the “Pragmatic Rationale” — in addition
to any of the above reasons, the act in question must be repressed because if not, the
perpetrator(s) might not be brought to justice unless a nation-state takes action. Id. 
The concept of Ius Gentium, the law of all nations, or alternatively, the law of all
peoples, is most famously spoken of in Justinian’s Institutes. See  J. INST. 1.1.3 (Peter Birks
& Grant McLeod trans., Cornell University Press 1987). The Ius Gentium is “the law which
natural reason makes for all mankind . . . . It is called ‘the law of all peoples’ because it is
common to every nation.” Id. at 1.1.2. The law of all nations should not be confused with
what is referred to as the modern “international law.” See WOLFGANG KUNKEL, AN
INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 73 (J.M. Kelly trans., Oxford
University Press 1966). The law of all nations was law the Romans perceived to be shared
by them with other peoples from surrounding nations. Id. They were shared social
institutions, not laws. See HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW: ITS CONNECTION WITH THE
EARLY HISTORY OF SOCIETY AND ITS RELATION TO MODERN IDEAS 47 (10th ed. 1963) (defining
the law of all nations as “the sum of the common ingredients in the customs of the old Italian
tribes, for they were all the nations whom the Romans had the means of observing, and who
sent successive swarms of immigrants to Roman soil”).
89. Lowe, supra note 81, at 343 (discussing traditional universal jurisdiction over high
seas piracy, and noting how it generally cannot be considered as “heinous” as other acts such
as genocide, war crimes, and even criminal acts against persons).
Council has also examined and recognized specific forms of
extraterritorial jurisdiction for criminal acts.87 
Practices based on the doctrine of universal jurisdiction have
become increasingly more relevant. The exertion of universal
jurisdiction is justified on the rationale that the act in question is
of such a grave and far-sweeping nature that any state is morally
bound to apprehend and/or stop the actor, regardless of nationality
or location.88 On the other hand, commentators have also pointed
out that the customary application of universal jurisdiction over
piracy — a crime not generally considered to be “heinous” relative
to other crimes such as genocide — may have been rationalized on
the premise that pirates on the high seas easily eluded capture.89 A
number of nations have enacted legislation that enables some form
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90. CASSESE, supra note 83, at 261-62 (noting adoption in some form of the universal
jurisdiction principle by Belgium, Germany, Italy, and Spain). 
91. Raf Casert, Belgium’s Highest Court Dismisses War Crimes Cases Against Former
President Bush and Others, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Sept. 24, 2003 (reporting the dismissal of
claims against George Bush, Dick Cheney, Colin Powell, and Ariel Sharon by a Belgian
court), available at LEXIS, European News Sources File.
92. Lowe, supra note 81, at 344 (describing treaty based jurisdiction as basically a form
of universal jurisdiction limited to the member-states of the treaty in question).
93. Id. at 343-45 (providing an overview of treaty-based jurisdiction and discussing
examples).
94. Convention for Human Rights, supra note 14, art. 1 (“The High Contracting Parties
shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section
I of this Convention); id. art. 32 (1) (“The jurisdiction of the Court shall extend to all matters
concerning the interpretation and application of the Convention and the protocols thereto
….”).
95. The United Nations at the turn of the New Century, Eur. Parl. Doc. (8822) § I ¶ 6
(2000), available at http://assembly.coe.int (last visited Mar. 3, 2005).
The Assembly fully supports the Secretary General of the United Nations
in his efforts to reconsider how the United Nations should respond to
crisis and which means should be employed in cases of massive and
systematic violations of human rights with grave humanitarian
consequences.  The Assembly understands the difficult balance between
legal, political and moral factors and the collision between national
sovereignty and the rights of individuals.  Humanitarian intervention
should be based on legitimate and universal principles set by the United
Nations.
Id.
96. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4 (“All Members shall refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the
United Nations.”). 
of prosecution based on universal jurisdiction.90 Perhaps most well-
known was the filing of complaints against various world leaders
under a Belgian universality law — complaints later dismissed at
the risk of straining diplomatic relations.91
Treaty jurisdiction offers a limited version of universal
jurisdiction.92 It essentially provides for jurisdiction over treaty-
defined criminal acts or violations committed within member-states
of that particular treaty.93 The European Convention on Human
Rights is a prototypical example of a treaty which provides for, in
the absence of national redress, judicial jurisdiction and authority
in the Court of Human Rights for violations of the Convention.94
The principal problem at issue is the extension of the Convention’s
jurisdiction over acts committed by member-states in areas not
covered by the Convention.  
A major form of extraterritorial action that has received support
by the Council of Europe, at least in principal, is humanitarian
intervention.95 Although armed intervention by one state in the
affairs of another is generally unaccepted in contemporary
international law and by the United Nations,96 an exception exists
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97. See U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 7.
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United
Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the
domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit
such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle
shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under
Chapter VII.
Id.
98. U.N. CHARTER art. 39. For an overview of principles and examples of U.N.
interventions, see L. C. GREEN, THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 318-26 (1993);
David J. Scheffer, U.N. Engagement in Ethnic Conflicts, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ETHNIC
CONFLICT 147 (David Wippman ed. 1998); Rüdiger Wolfrum, The UN Experience in Modern
Intervention, in INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION: SOVEREIGNTY VERSUS RESPONSIBILITY 95
(Michael Keren & Donald A. Sylvan eds., 2002). 
99. The principal article in the United Nations’ Charter authorizing use of force by the
Security Council is Article 42: 
Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in
Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may
take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to
maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may
include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or
land forces of Members of the United Nations.
U.N. CHARTER art. 42.
100. SLOMANSON, supra note 81, at 492 (noting that “[collective intervention] is readily
more justifiable than unilateral intervention”).
101. BRIAN D. LEPARD, RETHINKING HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 151-52 (2002) (discussing
definitions of the “threat to the peace” language in the United Nations Charter).
102. Id. at 153-59 (outlining examples in which United Nations Security Council resolutions
have characterized internal matters as threatening international peace, security, and
stability).
103. Id. at 154 (discussing the characterization of internal matters as having international
effects, thus justifying intervention in Haiti and Rwanda). 
for particular circumstances.97 Chapter Seven of the United
Nations’ Charter authorizes action in response to “threat[s] to the
peace, breach of the peace, or act[s] of aggression.”98 Collective
intervention, as recognized by the United Nations Charter,99 is
generally more acceptable than a unilateral approach.100 Although
traditionally a “threat to the peace” was deemed to be a threat to
peace between nations, therefore requiring the existence of an
actual armed conflict between nations,101 the United Nations has
more recently been inclined to justify intervention in internal civil
wars on the basis that their humanitarian consequences threaten
international peace and security.102 These characterizations
surrounded events authorizing military intervention in Haiti in
1993 and Rwanda in 1994.103 The North Atlantic Treaty
Organization’s (NATO) 1999 aerial bombardments in the former
Yugoslavia were a major case in point, elevating focus on the
United Nations Chapter VII articles which NATO had relied
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104. Christine Gray, The Use of Force and the International Legal Order, in INTERNATIONAL
LAW 589, 595-97 (Malcolm D. Evans ed., 1st ed. 2003) (discussing how NATO’s actions
resulted in “an extended debate on the issue as to whether [U.N. Charter] Article 2(4)
allowed the use of force for humanitarian intervention”).
105. Bankoviƒ and Others v. Belgium and Others, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 333, 333. The
nations sued were NATO members also party to the Convention on Human Rights. Id. at
339.
106. MICHAEL P. SCHARF, BALKAN JUSTICE: THE STORY BEHIND THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL
WAR CRIMES TRIAL SINCE NUREMBERG 24 (1997) (noting Marshall Tito’s creation of Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, Slovenia, and the autonomous areas
of Kosovo and Vojvodina).
107. JOHN ALLCOCK ET AL., CONFLICT IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 290-
91 (1998) (discussing the impact of Tito’s recreation of Yugoslavia and asserting that he be
seen “in part, as the architect of Yugoslavia’s problems in the 1990s”). See also SCHARF, supra
note 106, at 24 (noting that Tito’s creation of the individual republics of Yugoslavia was an
attempt to dilute Serbian dominance); Radek Sikorski, War In Europe Again, NAT’L REV.,
Dec. 16, 1991, at 40, 42 (asserting another explanation for the subsequent break-up of
Yugoslavia involving British support for the anti-Nazi communist partisans). 
108. DIANA JOHNSTONE, FOOLS’ CRUSADE: YUGOSLAVIA, NATO AND WESTERN DELUSIONS
18-19 (2002) (noting the development of nationalist parties in a number of elections in 1990).
See also PETER RADAN, THE BREAK-UP OF YUGOSLAVIA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 153-54 (2002)
(discussing the period between Tito’s death and the outbreak of military conflict and noting
the development of nationalist parties).
109. SCHARF, supra note 106, at 25 (asserting that Miloševiƒ was the “chief engineer”
arousing ethnic tensions that led to conflict in 1990 and 1991). See also Focus on Kosovo:
Wily Miloševiƒ makes the most of the worst, CNN.COM (assessing blame for the break-up of
Yugoslavia upon Miloševiƒ), at http://www.cnn.com (last visited Mar. 3, 2005). But see
JOHNSTONE, supra note 108, at 16-19, 26-27 (arguing that some of the blame targeting
Miloševiƒ as the principal culprit behind the ensuing war was undue and that Croatian
President Franjo Tudjman was mainly responsible).
110. SCHARF, supra note 106, at 25. It should be noted that fears of ethnic cleansing were
very real, as only decades earlier during World War II, Croatian fascists — ustaša —
exterminated or expelled Serbs en masse. See Vincent M. Creta, The Search for Justice in
upon.104 NATO’s involvement in that conflict served as the basis for
the case of Bankoviƒ and Others v. Belgium and Others.105 
III-A.  BANKOVI‚:  THE BACKGROUND
The backdrop to the Bankoviƒ decision originated from events
directly related to the dissolution of Yugoslavia and ethnic tensions
that had developed among rival communities. The communist
government of Yugoslavia had divided the nation into six republics
and two autonomous entities, one of which was Kosovo.106 The
government-imposed consensus and stability created out of
Yugoslavia’s multi-ethnic state set the stage for conflict upon
Marshall Tito’s death in 1980.107 Within the next ten years, ethnic
politics had escalated, and multiparty elections resulted in
significant gains for a variety of ethnic nationalist parties in
various republics.108 From there, the conventional view is that Serb
nationalists, led by Slobodan Miloševiƒ,109 manipulated ethnic
tensions and fear to spur the beginning of actual fighting.110
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the Former Yugoslavia and Beyond: Analyzing the Rights of the Accused Under the Statute
and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia, 20 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 381, 388-89 (1998). In response, Serbian militia —
èetnici — also killed Croats and Muslims. See Lisa L. Schmandt, Peace with Justice: Is It
Possible for the Former Yugoslavia? 30 TEX. INT'L L.J. 335, 337-38 (1995). Croatian President
Franjo Tudjman had resurrected the use of ustaša imagery, quite predictably causing fear
among Serbian minorities in Croatia. JOHNSTONE, supra note 108, at 27; Payam Akhavan,
Beyond Impunity: Can International Criminal Justice Prevent Future Atrocities? 95 AM. J.
INT’L L. 7, 11 (2001). In the infamous Serbian “rape camps” of the 1990s, Serb forces also
justified atrocities based upon ustaša imagery; one Croat woman reported that she was told
she was ustaša and had to be impregnated to give birth to a Serb instead.  Berta Esperanza
Hernández-Truyol, Women’s Rights as Human Rights — Rules, Realities and the Role of
Culture: A Formula for Reform, 21 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 605, 636 n.124 (1995-1996).
111. ALLCOCK, supra note 107, at 148-49 (discussing developments in Krajina in 1990-91).
112. See RADAN, supra note 108, at 156, in reference to U.S. Secretary of State James
Baker’s visit to Yugoslavia on June 21, 1991.
Although Baker called for restraint on all sides and reiterated continued
support for Yugoslavia’s territorial integrity, it was also clear to all of
Yugoslavia’s republic leaders that the USA, and thus the rest of the
international community, would not actively intervene in the crisis. This
amounted to giving the green light for the use of force against
secessionist republics. . . . Within days Slovenia and Croatia declared
their independence.
Id. 
113. SCHARF, supra note 106, at 26 (discussing the subsequent aftermath of Secretary of
State James Baker’s visit to Yugoslavia, and the beginning of all-out fighting). 
114. JOHNSTONE, supra note 108, at 29-30 (discussing massacres committed by the
“Croatian Knights” against Serbs in the Croatian town of Gospiæ); SCHARF, supra note 106,
at 26 (discussing a massacre of hospital patients in the Croatian town of Vukovar by Serbs).
115. RADAN, supra note 108, at 198-99 (discussing developments leading to Kosovo’s
declaration of independence from Serbia). See also Miranda Vickers, What Cost Kosovo?,
HIST. TODAY, Dec. 1991, at 6 (asserting that much of the ethnic strife surrounding
Yugoslavia’s break-up was due to the significance of Kosovo).
116. SCHARF, supra note 106, at 27 (discussing the spread of conflict into Bosnia-
Hercegovina).
117. Id. at 30-36 (asserting that the UN “could have acted to stop the atrocities” that
occurred in the early 1990s and noting failed diplomatic initiatives to either stop the conflict
or intervene militarily). 
Some of the earliest unrest began in the Serbian Krajina area
of Croatia in 1990.111 As repeated attempts at negotiations failed,
acquiescence on the international arena set the stage for major
conflict.112 On June 25, 1991, Croatia and Slovenia declared
independence, prompting Miloševiƒ to send the Yugoslavian army,
the majority of whom were Serbs, into those republics.113 Massacres
were committed by all sides.114 In July of 1990, predominantly-
Muslim Kosovo declared its separation from Serbia.115 Bosnia-
Hercegovina’s declaration of independence on March 3 of 1992
sparked a subsequent declaration of a Serbian Republic within
Bosnia, and fighting on a wider scale.116 
Despite various attempts by the United Nations and the
European Community to broker peace talks, fighting continued
with no outside military intervention.117 The infamous “siege of
178 J. TRANSNATIONAL LAW & POLICY [Vol. 14:2
118. The Yugoslavian crisis came at a time when many felt NATO had to revise its strategy
following Soviet disintegration. S. NELSON DREW ET AL., THE FUTURE OF NATO: FACING AN
UNRELIABLE ENEMY IN AN UNCERTAIN ENVIRONMENT 9-10 (1991) (discussing changing
European realities and a need to revise NATO strategy); NATO’s New Strategy, NAT’L REV.,
June 24, 1991, at 15 (noting revisions in NATO strategy).  
119. Ian Traynor, The Slow But Sure Sacking of Sarajevo, THE GUARDIAN (London), May
11, 1992, at 22 (discussing shelling and sniper fire that paralyzed Sarajevo and its residents),
available at LEXIS, European News Sources File; Ian Traynor, Vulnerable Convoys of
Refugees Flee “Dying” Sarajevo, THE GUARDIAN (London), May 19, 1992, at 8 (discussing the
refugee crisis in Sarajevo), available at LEXIS, European News Sources File; John Palmer
et al., U.S. Ready to Relieve Sarajevo, THE GUARDIAN (London), June 26, 1992, at 1
(discussing President Bush’s initiative to press for stronger actions against the Serbs with
allies), available at LEXIS, European News Sources File; Ruth Marcus & Rick Atkinson,
NATO Envoys Agree to Back U.S. Air Strike Plan in Bosnia, THE WASH. POST, Aug. 3, 1993
(discussing a U.S. air strike plan by NATO in conjunction with UN Security Council
resolutions), available at LEXIS, European News Sources File; Dusan Stojanovic, U.S.
Fighters Down Four Serb Warplanes Over Bosnia, THE ASSOC. PRESS, Feb. 28, 1994
(discussing the “first time NATO had struck militarily in its 44-year history” when U.S.
planes shot down Serbian jets violating the no-fly zone), available at LEXIS, European News
Sources File; Robert Burns, Allies May Sustain Air Attacks for Several Days, THE ASSOC.
PRESS, Aug. 30, 1995 (discussing the beginning of major NATO attacks against Serbian
positions), available at LEXIS, European News Sources File. For a description of post-siege
Sarajevo from the perspective of a foreign journalist, see GREG CAMPBELL, THE ROAD TO
KOSOVO 89-93 (1999).
120. ALLCOCK, supra note 107, at 70-71 (describing the Dayton Accords).
121. SCHARF, supra note 106, at 51-73 (describing the creation of the Yugoslavia War
Crimes Tribunal).
122. ALLCOCK, supra note 107, at 145-47 (describing the history of Kosovo and ethnic
tensions that led to conflict in 1998-99).
123. Laura Geissler, The Law of Humanitarian Intervention and the Kosovo Crisis, 23
HAMLINE L. REV. 323, 336 (2000) (discussing the background to NATO air strikes in Kosovo);
Klinton W. Alexander, NATO’s Intervention in Kosovo: The Legal Case for Violating
Yugoslavia’s National Sovereignty in the Absence of Security Council Approval, 22 HOUS. J.
INT'L L. 403, 431-34 (2000) (same).
124. BRUCE R. NARDULLI ET AL., DISJOINTED WAR: MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO, 1999
at 15 (2002) (noting the massacre of civilians in September of 1998 and continued tension in
October); John J. Merriam, Kosovo and The Law of Humanitarian Intervention, 33 CASE W.
RES. J. INT'L L. 111, 136-43 (2001) (describing accounts of human rights violations committed
in Kosovo).
Sarajevo” continued for several years, eventually prompting
NATO118 military action in August of 1995.119 The destruction of
substantial Serbian forces led to the conclusion of the U.S.
sponsored Dayton Accords,120 introduction of NATO peace-keeping
forces into the former Yugoslavia, and creation of the Yugoslavia
War Crimes Tribunal.121
However, tensions continued to build in Kosovo, a region
politically affiliated with Serbia but populated by a majority of
Muslim Albanians.122 In the late 1990s, members of the Kosovo
Liberation Army began targeting Serb government officials.123
Serbian forces responded by committing a series of atrocities
against civilians.124 On March 24, 1999, NATO commenced
Operation Allied Force to destroy Serbian military entities that
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125. BENJAMIN S. LAMBETH, NATO’S AIR WAR FOR KOSOVO: A STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL
ASSESSMENT 19 (2001) (discussing the beginning of Operation Allied Force).
126. WESLEY K. CLARK, WAGING MODERN WAR: BOSNIA, KOSOVO, AND THE FUTURE OF
COMBAT 193-94 (2001) (discussing the beginning of the military operation). 
127. LAMBETH, supra note 125, at 39 (discussing the widening of NATO strikes to civilian
targets such as media broadcast stations).
128. Marjorie Cohn, The Myth of Humanitarian Intervention in Kosovo, in LESSONS OF
KOSOVO: THE DANGERS OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 121, 121 (Aleksandar Jokic ed.,
2003) (discussing the civilian impact of the NATO campaign).
129. Bankoviƒ, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. at 339 (noting relationships between the plaintiffs
and deceased). 
130. Id. at 340-41 (describing events on the morning of April 23, 1999).
131. Id. at 345 (noting the complaints filed against the NATO states).
132. Convention for Human Rights, supra note 14, art. 2. As noted by Lambeth, although
the respondent governments were all European members of NATO, the United States also
had a clear role in contributing forces to Operation Allied Force. See LAMBETH, supra note
125, at 20-21 (noting that the initial strikes involved a large contingent of U.S. aircraft and
sea-launched missiles).
133. See Convention for Human Rights, supra note 14, art. 1 (“The High Contracting
Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in
[the Convention].”).
134. Id.
135. Bankoviƒ, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. at 345 (describing the plaintiff’s main claim).
threatened Kosovo.125 The first stage of the strikes involved the use
of missiles against select military targets,126 but progressed to
heavy bombardments of non-military infrastructure.127 At the
conclusion of Operation Allied Force, an estimated 500-1,800
civilians were killed by NATO strikes.128
III-B.  BANKOVI‚:  THE PLAINTIFFS’ ARGUMENT
In Bankoviƒ the plaintiffs were relatives of individuals killed
during Operation Allied Force129 after a NATO missile hit a media
station in Belgrade.130 The plaintiffs asserted131 that the NATO
governments, who were all member-states to the European
Convention on Human Rights, had violated Article 2 of the
Convention — the right to life.132 In determining whether or not the
case was admissible to the Court of Human Rights, the principal
issue was determining if Article 1 jurisdiction133 was implicated by
the air strikes, because at that time, Yugoslavia was not a
contracting party to the Convention. 
Noting that Article 1 of the Convention on Human Rights
obligates member-states to “secure to everyone within their
jurisdiction the rights and freedoms”134 of the Convention, the key
issue was determining what extraterritorial acts committed by
member-states constituted an extension of jurisdiction. The
plaintiffs asserted that the NATO air strikes brought them within
the jurisdiction of those governments.135 They relied on a series of
180 J. TRANSNATIONAL LAW & POLICY [Vol. 14:2
136. Loizidou v. Turkey, 310 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1995) (preliminary objections)
[hereinafter Loizidou I].
137. Id. at 10 (describing the plaintiff and noting her claims to property in Turkish-occupied
Cyprus).
138. Id. (describing the march by the “Women Walk Home” movement and subsequent
events resulting in Loizidou’s detention).
139. Convention for Human Rights, supra note 14, art. 3.
140. Id. art. 5.
141. Id. art. 8.
142. THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE, THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE’S MEMBER STATES (stating that
Cyprus joined the Council in 1961 and Turkey joined in 1949), at http://www.coe.int (last
visited Mar. 1, 2005).
143. YASEMIN ÇELIK, CONTEMPORARY TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY 62 (1999) (noting that
Turkish Cypriots declared the existence of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in 1983).
Only Turkey recognized the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.  F. STEPHEN LARRABEE
& IAN O. LESSER, TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY IN AN AGE OF UNCERTAINTY 78 (2003).
144. Loizidou I, 310 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 17, 21 (describing the positions of Turkey).
145. Id. at 23 (“In this respect the Court recalls that, although Article 1 sets limits on the
reach of the Convention, the concept of ‘jurisdiction’ under this provision is not restricted to
the national territory of the High Contracting Parties.”). 
previous Court judgments and admissibility decisions to support
their argument. 
1.  The Cyprus Cases
The principal case used by the plaintiffs was the Court’s
landmark 1995 decision in Loizidou v. Turkey.136 Loizidou was a
Cypriot who lived near the border of Turkish-occupied Cyprus, and
owned land within that part of the island.137 In March of 1989,
Loizidou and other members of a Cypriot women’s organization
marched across the border to demonstrate against the occupation,
and were subsequently stopped and detained by Turkish forces.138
Although she was released shortly thereafter, she sued the Turkish
government, alleging that her Article 3 Prohibition of Torture,139
Article 5 Right to Liberty,140 and Article 8 Right to Respect for
Private and Family Life141 protections had been violated. 
At the time of the event, both Turkey and Cyprus had been
member-states of the Council of Europe and parties to the
Convention.142 However, Turkey argued that the Court of Human
Rights did not have jurisdiction over the issue because at that time
the events did not occur within Turkey or Cyprus, but in the
“Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus,”143 and that Turkey had not
accepted the Court’s jurisdiction outside of its territorial
boundaries.144 
In its analysis, the Court noted that the reference to jurisdiction
in Article 1 of the Convention was not limited to territorial
boundaries of member-states.145 Actions such as personal
extraditions and forced expulsions involving non-member-states did
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146. Id. (noting case law in which “extradition or expulsion of a person by a Contracting
State may give rise to an issue . . . and hence engage the responsibility of that State under
the Convention”).
147. Id. at 24.
148. Id.
149. Id. 
150. Id. (“[T]he respondent Government have [sic] acknowledged that the applicant’s loss
of control of her property stems from the occupation of the northern part of Cyprus by
Turkish troops.”).
151. Loizidou v. Turkey, 1996-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 2216, 2234-35 [hereinafter Loizidou II].
trigger Convention jurisdiction,146 as did acts committed by
member-states that “produce effects outside their own territory.”147
In the instant case, the Court noted that military action or
occupation — when a member-state “exercises effective control of an
area outside its national territory”148  — also produces an
“obligation to secure, in such an area, the rights and freedoms set
out in the Convention,”149 and it was clear that Turkish occupation
of northern Cyprus was related to Loizidou’s claims.150 As the Court
later stated in its judgment on the merits of the case: 
[I]n conformity with the relevant principles of
international law governing State responsibility, …
responsibility of a Contracting Party could arise
when as a consequence of military action — whether
lawful or unlawful — it exercises effective control of
an area outside its national territory. The obligation
to secure, in such an area, the rights and freedoms
set out in the Convention, derives from the fact of
such control . . . . 
. . . It is obvious from the large number of troops
engaged in active duties in northern Cyprus . . . that
[Turkey’s] army exercises effective overall control
over that part of the island. Such control, according
to the relevant test and in the circumstances of the
case, entails her responsibility . . . . Those affected by
such policies or actions therefore come within the
“jurisdiction” of Turkey for the purposes of Article 1
of the Convention.151  
The “effective control” Turkey had over northern Cyprus thus
brought those within its occupation under its jurisdiction, extending
the protections of the Convention to those within the scope of that
control. 
182 J. TRANSNATIONAL LAW & POLICY [Vol. 14:2
152. Cyprus v. Turkey, 2001-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 1.
153. Id. at 11 (outlining complaints filed against Turkey by Cyprus).
154. Id. at 21 (“[I]n terms of Article 1 of the Convention, Turkey’s ‘jurisdiction’ must be




157. Id. at 25 (noting the consequences of a “vacuum” in human rights protections to the
individuals living under occupation).
158. Bankoviƒ, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. at 349 (decision as to admissibility) (citing IlaÕcu and
Others v. Moldova and Russia, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 48787/99 (2004)), at http://www.echr.
coe.int (last visited Mar. 1, 2005).
159. William Crowther, The Politics of Ethno-National Mobilization:  Nationalism and
Reform in Soviet Moldovia, 50 THE RUSSIAN REV. 183, 184-86 (1991) (outlining demographic
characteristics of Moldova). For an outline of historic ethnic/religious tensions in Moldova,
see Nicholas Dima, Politics and Religion in Moldova: A Case Study, 34 THE MANKIND
QUARTERLY 175, 175-94 (1994). 
160. Charles King, Eurasia Letter: Moldova With A Russian Face, 97 FOREIGN POL’Y 106,
106-07 (1994) (outlining events subsequent to Moldova’s independence). 
The effective control test enshrined in the Loizidou holding was
later reaffirmed in Cyprus v. Turkey.152 In that case, Cyprus sued
Turkey for a wide array of alleged violations stemming from
Turkish occupation, including “disappearances” of Greek-Cypriots
and violations of Articles 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 17, and
18.153 Relying on Loizidou, the Court concluded that Turkish
military occupation of northern Cyprus expanded all rights and
protections of the Convention to those within that territory.154 The
Court also expanded on the effective control principle.  Noting that
Cyprus — as a Council of Europe member and signatory to the
Convention — was denied the ability to secure the Convention
rights in the occupied part of that country, the Court stated that
such a situation amounted to a “vacuum in the system of human-
rights protection.”155 Because the Convention was an “instrument
of European public order,”156 it had to apply to the inhabitants of a
nation party to the Convention, otherwise they would have no other
recourse to secure their rights.157 
2.  Admissibility in IlaÕcu v. Moldova and Russia
In a case similar to Loizidou implicating jurisdictional issues,
the Bankoviƒ claimants cited the Court’s admissibility decision in
IlaÕcu and Others v. Moldova and the Russian Federation.158 Once
a former republic of the Soviet Union, Moldova is ethnically divided
between a majority of Moldovans and a minority of Slavic
peoples.159 After Moldova’s declaration of independence in 1991, a
pro-Russian and separatist “‘Transnistrian Moldovan Republic’”
was declared on the east side of the Dniester River, sparking a
minor civil war.160 Russia’s Fourteenth Army remained in the
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161. Id. (discussing Russia’s involvement in Moldova).
162. IlaÕcu, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 48787/99 at 5-7 (2004), (describing the plaintiffs’ arrests
and trials) at http://www.echr.coe.int (last visited Mar. 1, 2005).
163. Id. at 8-10 (describing instances of alleged beatings, shootings, and mock executions
suffered by the applicants).
164. Id. at 14-15 (describing the position of the Moldovan government).
165. Id. at 16.
166. Id. at 21 (referencing the Loizidou control test and finding the issue admissible for
further determination on its merits).
167. Bankoviƒ, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. at 349 (citing Issa and Others v. Turkey, Eur. Ct.
H.R. App. No. 31821/96 (2000)) (decision as to admissibility), at http://www.echr.coe.int (last
visited Mar. 1, 2005).
168. Issa and Others v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 31821/96 2 (2000) (describing the
applicants and their livelihoods and relationships to the deceased).
169. Id. (describing the applicant’s alleged encounter).
separatist portion and aided Slavic paramilitaries against
Moldovans.161
In IlaÕcu, the plaintiffs were arrested in 1992 by Transnistrian
security forces, tried and found guilty by a Transnistrian court for
terrorism-related charges, and imprisoned.162 While in prison, they
were allegedly beaten, drugged, shot, and psychologically tortured
by Transnistrian and Russian military forces.163 
The Government of Moldova, which had ratified the Convention
on Human Rights in 1997 — argued that it did not have de facto
control of the east bank of the Dniester — the breakaway
Transnistrian Republic — and hence did not have responsibility or
jurisdiction for an area they did not control.164 The Russian
Federation also argued that it had no jurisdiction in Transnistria
as well, and that its military forces stationed there were for
“peacemaking duties.”165 Citing Loizidou, the Court found the case
admissible for further review on its merits, because Russian
jurisdiction may have been implicated either through the actions of
its own forces or a proxy entity.166
3.  Admissibility in Issa v. Turkey
The Bankoviƒ plaintiffs also relied on the Court’s admissibility
decision in Issa and Others v. Turkey,167 involving extraterritorial
action taken by Turkey against Kurds in Iraq — obviously a non-
Council of Europe nation. In Issa, the plaintiffs were Iraqi women
living on the Iraqi side of the border with Turkey.168 They alleged
that an encounter had occurred between Turkish military forces
deployed in Northern Iraq and the applicants in April of 1995 while
they were sheep-herding.169 In the encounter, the soldiers allegedly
began beating and abusing the shepherds, and then ordered the
women to return to their village while keeping the men in their
184 J. TRANSNATIONAL LAW & POLICY [Vol. 14:2
170. Id. (“The [Turkish soldiers] started shouting abuse at the eleven shepherds, beating
them with their rifle butts, kicking them and slapping them on the face. Then they separated
the women from the men. They told the women to return to the village and took the men
away.”).
171. Id. at 3 (“The bodies had been shot at several times and were badly mutilated — ears,
tongues and genitals missing.”).
172. Id. at 4 (describing Turkey’s position in the complaint).
173. Id. at 8 (declaring the case admissible to the European Court of Human Rights). 
174. Bankoviƒ, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. at 348-49 (describing the plaintiffs’ arguments
applying the effective control test of Loizidou to the instant case).
175. Id. at 349 (describing the plaintiffs’ stance that when a Convention member-state
conducts air strikes, they should be “held accountable for those Convention rights within
their control in the situation in question”).
176. Id. at 349-50.
177. Id. (describing the plaintiffs’ emphasis on the purpose of the Convention).
custody.170 Within the next two-three days the detained shepherds
were found shot dead and mutilated.171 The Turkish government
claimed that although a military incursion into Iraq had occurred
at that time, there was no record of the alleged event.172 Charging
Turkey with multiple violations of the European Convention on
Human Rights, the Court admitted the case for review on its
merits.173  
In sum, the Bankoviƒ plaintiffs asserted that the IlaÕcu and Issa
admissibility decisions and ruling in Loizidou and Cyprus together
suggested that a signatory to the Convention on Human Rights
could be sued in the Court for actions taken either in non-Council
of Europe nations, or areas within the Council marked by
ambiguous authority (i.e., the “Turkish Republic of Northern
Cyprus” or “Transnistrian Republic”), if jurisdiction was established
through effective control by a Council member-state.  In the case of
Yugoslavia — then a non-Council of Europe nation — the plaintiffs
acknowledged that NATO may not have had complete control over
that nation, as Turkey did in Northern Cyprus through its
occupation.174 However, by virtue of the deliberately planned and
precision-guided military air strikes, they had enough control to be
responsible for the consequences of the strikes, and should thus be
held accountable for the resulting damage and deaths under the
Convention that NATO knew would occur, amounting to an
obligation to uphold not all Convention protections — but just
those actions in which control was maintained.175 Finally, the
plaintiffs argued that if NATO did not fall under Convention
jurisdiction for its actions in Yugoslavia, the governments would be
“free to act with impunity”176 abroad, and the basic mission of the
Convention — to secure the fundamental human right to life in
Europe — would be entirely circumvented.177
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178. Id. at 347. 
179. Id. at 347 (describing the respondents’ defense regarding the textual differences
between the Geneva Convention and the European Convention on Human Rights); id. at 344
(citing language from the Geneva Conventions).
180. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31, art. 1.  
181. Convention for Human Rights, supra note 14, art. 1.
182. Bankoviƒ, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. at 346 (describing the respondent governments’
assertion that “jurisdiction” only referred to the exercise of legal authority, such as the
arrests and detentions of individuals).
183. Id. at 347 (“The Governments conclude that it is clear that the conduct of which the
applicants complain could not be described as the exercise of such legal authority or
competence.”).
184. Id. at 347-48 (describing the respondents’ arguments related to alleged “serious
consequences for collective international military action”).
185. Id. at 348 (describing the respondents’ assertion distinguishing the Loizidou case with
the instant one).
III-C.  BANKOVI‚:  NATO’S ARGUMENT
The respondents’ (governments of NATO nations) argument
rested on a number of points. Its major contention was that the
plaintiffs’ type of claim was not originally intended to be scrutinized
by the Convention.178 If the Convention drafters intended to allow
broad and loose “cause-and-effect” claims before the Court, in which
the consequences of any member-states’ extraterritorial actions
would be reviewed, then the text of the Convention would be similar
to that of the Geneva Conventions,179 which state that “[t]he High
Contracting Parties undertake to respect and to ensure respect for
the present Convention in all circumstances.”180 Instead, the
European Convention does not cover acts occurring in all
circumstances, but only those falling under the Article 1 obligation
to “secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and
freedoms”181 of the Convention. The exercise of jurisdiction, as
defined by the respondent governments, only referred to
traditionally-accepted notions of exercises cloaked with the emblem
of legal authority, such as an arrest or detention.182
Similarly, the NATO governments argued that the military
actions taken in Yugoslavia could not be equated with such
traditional notions of legal authority purportedly covered by the
Convention.183 If such activities fell under the jurisdiction of the
Convention, then all extraterritorial military missions would be
reviewed by the European Court of Human Rights, an expansion of
the Court to uncharted territory already covered by other
international legal entities.184 The NATO governments also argued
that their alleged control over Yugoslavia’s airspace did not equate
with the control exercised by Turkey in Northern Cyprus in
Loizidou,185 and that while Cyprus and all its citizens had
186 J. TRANSNATIONAL LAW & POLICY [Vol. 14:2
186. Id. at 347 (noting the respondents’ assertion that Yugoslavia “was not and is not a
party to the Convention and its inhabitants had no existing rights under the Convention.”)
187. Id. at 350 (“[T]he essential question to be examined therefore is whether the applicants
and their deceased relatives were . . . capable of falling within the jurisdiction of the
respondent States.”). 
188. Bankoviƒ, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. at 350-51 (noting the importance of interpreting the
ordinary meaning of “within their jurisdiction” as required by the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties). 
189. Id. at 351-52 (concluding that the ordinary meaning of jurisdiction was based on
territorial control).
190. Id. at 354 (noting that jurisdiction is “essentially territorial” in nature and that actions
conducted abroad are instances of exceptional expansion of jurisdiction). 
191. See id. (outlining and re-affirming the Loizidou case).
192. Bankoviƒ, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. at 355 (summarizing the Court’s previous holdings
in the Loizidou and Cyprus cases).
193. Id. at 356.
previously enjoyed the protections of the Convention prior to
Turkish occupation, Yugoslavia and the Bankoviƒ plaintiffs were
not previously, nor at the time of the incident, covered under the
Convention.186
III-D.  THE COURT’S DECISION IN BANKOVI‚
The Court began its analysis by outlining the issue as a question
of whether or not the Bankoviƒ plaintiffs were covered under
NATO’s jurisdiction through its military actions.187 Examining the
meaning of “jurisdiction” by defining its ordinary meaning under
applicable treaty laws,188 the Court concluded that jurisdiction
ordinarily referred to government exercise of authority within its
territorial boundaries.189 Instances of extraterritorial action were
thus considered to be exceptional cases,190 and the Court’s Loizidou
ruling was one such exception as it was based on effective control
of Turkey in the disputed area.191 The Court thus recognized the
continued legitimacy of its previous rulings in Loizidou and
Cyprus.192
The Court then reviewed the applicants’ argument that, in the
absence of overall effective control, a member-state should not be
responsible for all Convention protections, but only those relative
to the amount of control possessed. In examining the assertion that
NATO’s jurisdiction could derive from control vis-à-vis the air
strikes, the Court stated that such logic was “tantamount to
arguing that anyone adversely affected by an act imputable to a
Contracting State, wherever in the world that act may have been
committed or its consequences felt, is thereby brought within the
jurisdiction of that State for the purpose of Article 1 of the
Convention.”193 Agreeing with the respondent governments, the
Court found no textual evidence in the Convention supporting such
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194. Id. at 357 (stating that “[h]ad the drafters of the Convention wished to ensure
jurisdiction as extensive as that advocated by the applicants, they could have adopted a text
identical or similar to” language in the Geneva Conventions).
195. Id. at 358 (discussing and distinguishing Loizidou and Cyprus v. Turkey from the
instant case).
196. Id. at 358-59 (stating that the Convention is a treaty “in an essentially regional context
and notably in the legal space (espace juridique) of the Contracting States. The FRY clearly
does not fall within this legal space”).
197. Id. at 359.
198. Öcalan v. Turkey, 37 Eur. H.R. Rep. 238, 252 (2003) (judgment) (describing the
applicant’s background).
199. AMIKAM NACHMANI, TURKEY: FACING A NEW MILLENNIUM: COPING WITH INTERTWINED
CONFLICTS 36-37 (2003) (outlining the aims of the PKK and noting that its 1984 rebellion was
the seventeenth Kurdish uprising against Turkey). See also HENRI J. BARKEY & GRAHAM E.
FULLER, TURKEY’S KURDISH QUESTION 23-29 (1998) (discussing the goals of the PKK and its
ideological foundations).
200. MICHAEL M. GUNTER, THE KURDS AND THE FUTURE OF TURKEY 11-14 (1997) (outlining
Turkish human rights violations in its conduct of operations against the Kurds); HELSINKI
WATCH, DESTROYING ETHNIC IDENTITY: THE KURDS OF TURKEY 7-18 (1988) (outlining Turkish
a view that the Convention’s protections could be “divided and
tailored” relative to the proportionate amount of control at hand.194
Finally, the Court agreed with the NATO governments that a
significant fact in Loizidou was that the inhabitants of Cyprus had
previously been covered by the Convention prior to the Turkish
occupation, distinguishing that situation from the one in
Yugoslavia.195 The Court reiterated the regional nature of the
Convention, asserting that it covered a “legal space” that did not
include Yugoslavia at that time.196 Therefore, the Court concluded
that the plaintiffs did not fall under NATO’s jurisdiction, nor the
Court’s jurisdiction, since “[t]he Convention was not designed to be
applied throughout the world.”197 The Court thus unanimously
declared the case inadmissible. By citing Loizidou for the principle
that extraterritorial jurisdiction can exist when one nation has
effective control of another, but also stating that the Convention
was meant to apply only within the Council of Europe and not
“throughout the world,” the Court seemed to state that Council
member-nations can only have extraterritorial jurisdiction in other
member-nations.
IV-A.  THE ÖCALAN CASE
Abdullah Öcalan was a Kurd of Turkish nationality and head of
the Worker’s Party of Kurdistan (PKK) — a separatist Kurdish
organization.198 The PKK had initiated a wide-scale insurgency
characterized by guerrilla and terrorist-style tactics in the 1980s.199
The ultimate aim of the uprising was the creation of an
independent Kurdish state from Turkey — which had historically
conducted repressive policies against its Kurdish population.200
188 J. TRANSNATIONAL LAW & POLICY [Vol. 14:2
ethnic identity policies and conduct of torture by security forces); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
TURKEY: FORCED DISPLACEMENT OF ETHNIC KURDS FROM SOUTHEASTERN TURKEY Vol. 6 No.
12, 10-21 (1994) (outlining reports of forced displacement of Kurds by Turkish forces in its
conduct of operations against the PKK); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, TURKEY: HUMAN RIGHTS AND
THE EUROPEAN UNION ACCESSION PARTNERSHIP 4 (vol. 12, no. 10 (D), 2000) (“The persistence
of torture in Turkey is an indisputable matter of record.”).
201. Öcalan, 37 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 252 (describing his travels through various nations
seeking asylum).
202. Id. at 253 (noting outstanding Turkish arrest warrants for Öcalan alleging “founding
an armed gang in order to destroy the territorial integrity of the State and of instigating
various terrorist acts that had resulted in loss of life”).
203. Id. at 255 (“The applicant also told the prosecutor that after leaving Syria on October
9, 1998 he had gone first to Greece and then to Russia and Italy. When the latter two
countries refused to grant him the status of political refugee, he had been taken to Kenya by
the Greek secret services.”).
204. Id. at 252-53 (describing events in Nairobi prior to the applicant’s arrest).
205. Öcalan, 37 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 253 (describing the applicant’s arrest by Turkish agents
in an international zone of Nairobi Airport).
206. Id. at 253.
The Kenyan Minister of Foreign Affairs added that the Kenyan
authorities had played no part in the applicant’s arrest and had had no
say in his final destination. The Minister had not been informed of any
operations by Turkish security forces at the time of the applicant’s
departure and there had been no consultations between the Kenyan and
Turkish Governments on the subject.
Id.
207. Id. at 253-54 (describing alleged conditions of Öcalan’s flight to Turkey). 
208. Id. at 254-55 (describing conditions of Öcalan’s detention following his arrest).
209. Id. at 255 (noting that one of his lawyers was prevented from leaving his office by
In late 1998 and early 1999, Öcalan traveled through Greece,
Russia, and Italy, seeking asylum after being forced to leave
Syria.201 As leader of the PKK, Turkey had issued a number of
warrants for his arrest.202 In February of 1999, Öcalan was
allegedly taken to Kenya by Greek secret services after being
denied asylum.203 For several days he stayed at the Greek
Ambassador’s residence, but was later informed that he could leave
Kenya and travel to the Netherlands.204 On February 15, Öcalan
left the Greek embassy in a car driven by a Kenyan official, was
taken to an international area of Nairobi Airport, and was arrested
by Turkish agents after boarding a plane.205 The Government of
Kenya stated that they played no knowing role in his arrest at the
airport.206
Upon his arrest, Öcalan was alleged to have been photographed,
videotaped, and periodically blindfolded or hooded during the flight
to Turkey.207 On February 16, he was incarcerated at the Ýmrali
Prison Island in Turkey, which had immediately transferred
prisoners to other locations and was declared a military zone, and
interrogated for several days by Turkish agents.208 Turkish officials
prevented several of Öcalan’s attorneys from visiting him in prison
or entering the country to aid in his defense.209 He was first allowed
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Turkish officials and other attorneys were stopped from entering the country at Istanbul
Airport).
210. Öcalan, 37 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 255.
On February 25, 1999 the applicant was able to talk to two of the sixteen
lawyers who had asked to see him, Mr. Z. Okçuoglu and Mr. H. Korkut.
The first conversation took place in the presence of a judge and of
members of the security forces wearing masks. The latter decided that
it should not last longer than [twenty] minutes.
Id.
211. Id. at 257-59 (outlining events during Öcalan’s trial leading to his indictment and
sentencing).
212. Id. at 238-40 (outlining determinations by the Court on alleged violations of
Convention Articles 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 13, 14, 18, 34, and 41).
213. Convention for Human Rights, supra note 14, art. 5 § 1 (“Everyone has the right to
liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following
cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law.”).  
214. Öcalan, 37 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 274. 
215. Id. at 271 (outlining Öcalan’s argument that his arrest “did not comply with Kenyan
law or the rules established by international law, that his arrest amounted to an abduction
and that his detention and trial, which were based on that unlawful arrest, had to be
regarded as null and void”).
216. Id. at 270 (outlining Öcalan’s argument that “[m]ere collusion between Kenyan
officials operating without authority and the Turkish Government could not constitute inter-
state co-operation . . . . The applicant further alleged that the Kenyan officials implicated in
his arrest had been bribed.”).
to visit with attorneys on February 25 in the presence of a Turkish
judge and masked security officials.210 After a series of trials by a
State Security Court, in June of 1999 Öcalan was found guilty of
instructing crimes and attacks aimed towards the establishment of
an independent Marxist Kurdish state and was sentenced to
death.211
Before the European Court of Human Rights, Öcalan sued
Turkey for a variety of Convention violations stemming from his
arrest, treatment in custody, trial, and subsequent sentencing to
death.212 However, the major issue pertaining to extension of
jurisdiction for extraterritorial actions revolved around Öcalan’s
Article 5 § 1 claim — which prohibits a person’s deprivation of
liberty in the absence of a “procedure prescribed by law.”213 The
issue facing the Court was whether or not Turkey’s act of detaining
Öcalan at Nairobi Airport constituted an extension of its
jurisdiction, bringing him under the protection of the Convention.214
Öcalan asserted that he did fall within Turkey’s jurisdiction and
that Turkey had violated the Convention’s Article 5 § 1 protections
because his arrest amounted to an abduction not prescribed by law,
thus voiding his subsequent trial and sentence.215 Based on
statements from Kenyan officials about their lack of involvement in
his arrest, he asserted that there was no official collaboration for
extradition between the governments of Turkey and Kenya leading
to his arrest.216 Öcalan relied on Cyprus v. Turkey and other cases
190 J. TRANSNATIONAL LAW & POLICY [Vol. 14:2
217. Id. at 270-71 (referring to Cyprus v. Turkey to argue that Turkey had violated Öcalan’s
Article 5 rights).
218. Id. at 271 (noting Turkey’s argument that “their responsibility was not engaged by the
applicant’s arrest abroad”).
219. Id. at 271-72 (outlining Turkey’s arguments).
220. Öcalan, 37 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 272.
221. Id. at 273 (outlining precedent holding that Article 5 protections could be implicated
in the case of cooperation between states for extradition of criminals).
222. Id. (“The Court further notes that the Convention contains no provisions concerning
the circumstances in which extradition may be granted, or the procedure to be followed
before extradition may be granted.”).
223. Id. at 274. 
to assert that Turkey’s Article 5 § 1 obligations were implicated by
his abduction at Nairobi Airport.217 
Relying on Bankoviƒ, Turkey asserted, “without further
explanation,” that it was not responsible for Öcalan’s arrest.218 On
the contrary, Turkey argued that Kenya had arrested Öcalan, that
Kenya was a sovereign nation and Turkey had no means of
exercising its jurisdiction there, and that Kenya simply released
Öcalan into Turkey’s custody as a matter of interstate
cooperation.219
IV-B.  THE ÖCALAN RULING
In a brief analysis of the Article 5 § 1 issue, the Court began by
recognizing that Article 5 § 1’s protection of a person’s liberty
reflected a purpose “to protect individuals from arbitrariness.”220
Interstate cooperation to extradite an individual could implicate
Article 5 § 1 obligations if its protections were violated.221 However,
the Convention itself did not contain guidelines beyond the
protections stated in Article 5 § 1 which spoke directly to how
interstate extraditions should be effected.222 Thus, the critical
question at hand was whether “‘beyond all reasonable doubt’ . . . the
authorities of the State to which the applicant has been transferred
have acted extra-territorially in a manner that is inconsistent with
the sovereignty of the host State.”223 A finding that Turkey, in its
pursuit of Öcalan, had violated its arrest procedures or violated
Kenya’s sovereignty, would have amounted to a violation of the
Convention.
To determine if Turkish procedures complied with the
Convention’s Article 5 § 1 obligations, the Court first had to
determine whether or not Öcalan was brought within Turkey’s
jurisdiction in Nairobi. The Court revisited Bankoviƒ and noted that
the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction by a member-state to the
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224. Id. (citing the Court’s statements in the Bankoviƒ case acknowledging the exceptional
nature of a finding that jurisdiction can be exercised beyond the territorial boundaries of a
state). 
225. Öcalan, 37 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 274-75.
226. Id. at 275 (“It follows that [Öcalan’s] arrest and detention complied with orders that
had been issued by the Turkish courts.”).
227. Id. at 276 (“[T]he Court holds that it has not been established beyond all reasonable
doubt that the operation carried out in the instant case partly by Turkish officials and partly
by Kenyan officials amounted to a violation by Turkey of Kenyan sovereignty.”).
228. Id. (“It follows that the applicant’s arrest on February 15, 1999 and his detention must
be regarded as having been in accordance with ‘a procedure prescribed by law’ for the
purposes of [Article 5 § 1 (c)] of the Convention. Consequently, there has been no violation
of [Article 5 § 1] of the Convention.”).
Öcalan did, however, win several of his other claims. The Court found Turkey had
violated parts of Article 3, Article 5 § 3 and § 4, and Article 6 § 1, but had not violated Article
2, parts of Article 3, Article 5 § 1, and Article 14. Id. at 311-13. The Turkish government also
changed its Constitution, rescinding Öcalan’s death sentence. Id. at 293. At the time of this
writing, Öcalan remains in Turkish custody with a life sentence.
Convention was only recognized in exceptional situations.224 The
Court then noted that:
In the instant case, the applicant was arrested by
members of the Turkish security forces inside an
aircraft in the international zone of Nairobi Airport.
Directly after he had been handed over by the
Kenyan officials to the Turkish officials the applicant
was under effective Turkish authority and was
therefore brought within the “jurisdiction” of that
State for the purposes of [Article] 1 of the
Convention, even though in this instance Turkey
exercised its authority outside its territory. The
Court considers that the circumstances of the present
case are distinguishable from those in the
aforementioned Bankoviƒ case, notably in that the
applicant was physically forced to return to Turkey
by Turkish officials and was subject to their
authority and control following his arrest and return
to Turkey.225
Having found that Turkey was bound by its Convention obligations,
the Court subsequently found that it had neither violated its own
arrest procedures,226 nor Kenya’s sovereignty using a “beyond all
reasonable doubt” threshold.227 It therefore did not violate Article
5 § 1 of the Convention.228 
192 J. TRANSNATIONAL LAW & POLICY [Vol. 14:2
229. Loizidou I, 310 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 24.
230. Id.
231. Cyprus v. Turkey, 2001-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 25 (recognizing Turkish jurisdiction over
occupied Cyprus vis-à-vis the “local administration which survives by virtue of Turkish
military and other support”).
232. Id.
233. Bankoviƒ, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. at 356-57.
[The applicant’s] claim that the positive obligation under Article 1
extends to securing the Convention rights in a manner proportionate to
the level of control exercised in any given extra-territorial situation. The
Governments contend that this amounts to a “cause-and-effect” notion of
V.  EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF THE EUROPEAN
CONVENTION IN THE WAKE OF BANKOVI‚, ÖCALAN, AND OTHER
CASES
The holdings in Bankoviƒ, Öcalan, and other aforementioned
cases have left several unanswered questions. Loizidou, and its
affirmation in Cyprus, laid clear the doctrine that effective control
engenders responsibility to uphold the Convention’s protections:  
[T]he responsibility of a Contracting Party may also
arise when as a consequence of military action —
whether lawful or unlawful — it exercises effective
control of an area outside its national territory. The
obligation to secure, in such an area, the rights and
freedoms set out in the Convention derives from the
fact of such control . . . .229 
This obligation is imputed to a member-state either through its
military or vis-à-vis “a subordinate local administration.”230 Such a
subordinate entity includes proxy governments supported by a
member-state, such as the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus”
which was administering the occupied portions of Cyprus.231 When
the effective control amounts to “effective overall control[,] . . . [the
member-state’s] ‘jurisdiction’ must be considered to extend to
securing the entire range of substantive rights set out in the
Convention.”232
Bankoviƒ clearly limited this assertion. The Court’s reasoning
in Bankoviƒ seems inconsistent with other decisions by the Court.
In response to the applicant’s Loizidou/Cyprus effective control
argument, the Bankoviƒ Court asserted that the Convention’s
protections could not be divided and applied in a level
commensurate to the action at issue, and to recognize jurisdiction
in such cases would amount to allowing anyone in the world
affected by a member-state’s actions to be brought under the
Convention’s jurisdiction.233 In one sense, Bankoviƒ reaffirms the
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jurisdiction not contemplated by or appropriate to Article 1 of the
Convention. The Court considers that the applicants’ submission is
tantamount to arguing that anyone adversely affected by an act
imputable to a Contracting State, wherever in the world that act may
have been committed or its consequences felt, is thereby brought within
the jurisdiction of that State for the purpose of Article 1 of the
Convention.
. . . [T]he Court is of the view that the wording of Article 1 does not
provide any support for the applicants’ suggestion that the positive
obligation in Article 1 to secure “the rights and freedoms defined in
Section I of [the] Convention” can be divided and tailored in accordance
with the particular circumstances of the extraterritorial act in question
. . . .
Id.
234. Stocké v. Germany, 199 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 1, 24 (1991) (Commission report).
235. Report of the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, Areas where the
European Convention on Human Rights cannot be implemented, EUR. PARL. DOC. 9730, § V,
¶ 41 (Mar. 11, 2003) [hereinafter Committee Report], available at http://assembly.coe.int. 
effective control doctrine and makes the determination of whether
effective control exists a question of fact. In Loizidou and Cyprus,
Turkish military occupation of parts of Cyprus was enough for the
Court to find that such effective overall control obligated Turkey to
expand its Convention responsibilities to those areas. 
NATO’s air campaign in Yugoslavia, and its arguable control
over its airspace, was certainly not analogous to the military
occupation of Cyprus. However, by requiring such effective overall
control vis-à-vis military occupation, the Court neglected the
principle that under the Convention, extraterritorial jurisdiction
should be broadened to “bring any other person ‘within the
jurisdiction’ of that State to the extent that they exercise authority
over such persons. Insofar as the State’s acts or omissions affect
such persons, the responsibility of that State is engaged.”234 As
recognized by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe
on the topic of extraterritorial jurisdiction, the effective overall
control of the type in Cyprus is not a requirement of jurisdiction: 
Accordingly the State’s “jurisdiction” is not
limited to its territory; it extends to all persons
“under its actual authority and responsibility”. The
main difference with the northern Cyprus cases is of
course that there is no lasting and effective control
over an area. The consequence is that the State
concerned is not required to secure the entire range of
substantive rights set out in the Convention, but
rather to respect the individual’s rights “to the extent
that it exercises authority over such persons”.235
194 J. TRANSNATIONAL LAW & POLICY [Vol. 14:2
236. Bankoviƒ, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. at 356-57 (rejecting a “cause-and-effect” application
of the Convention).
237. Rick Lawson, Life After Bankoviƒ: On the Extra-Territorial Reach of the ECHR 10
(Apr. 2, 2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (“The northern Cyprus saga
might create the impression that effective overall control is required for a State to be held
responsible for its acts abroad . . . [b]ut this would be to ignore the existing case-law of the
Commission.”). Professor Lawson served as legal advisor to the applicants in the Bankoviƒ
case, and his article serves as an excellent overview of the current status of extraterritorial
application of the European Convention. 
238. Sarah Williams & Sangeeta Shah, Comment, Bankoviƒ and Others v. Belgium and 16
Other Contracting States, 6 EUR. H.R. L. REV. 775, 781 (2002). One proffered explanation for
the Court’s decision is patently political in nature — that it did not want to extend
jurisdiction, and hence liability, to NATO forces acting in a perceived “just” war. See
Alexandra Ruth & Mirja Trilsch, International Decisions, 97 AM. J.. INT’L L. 168, 172 (2003).
What might explain the defensive stance assumed by the Court is that
the admissibility of the instant case was difficult and awkward not only
with regard to the extraterritoriality of the impugned acts, but also with
regard to the question of whether — and if so, which — contracting
parties are responsible under the Convention for actions carried out
within the framework of NATO. By adopting a restrictive approach in
relation to the question concerning extraterritoriality, the Court avoided
the need to address the one concerning NATO.
Id. Professor Lawson offers a detailed criticism of the Court’s parsing of the issue of defining
control in the Yugoslavian situation. See Lawson, supra note 237, at 17-21.
239. Cyprus, 2001-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. at 25 (discussing the importance of circumventing a
“vacuum” in human rights protections).
Bankoviƒ deviates from this principle by asserting that the
Convention’s protections cannot be applied in proportion to the act
of the member-state in question.236 Critics of Bankoviƒ have
appropriately pointed out that the effective control in the
Loizidou/Cyprus cases should not be a prerequisite for a finding of
extraterritorial jurisdiction, but only one example of such.237 By
asserting that Convention protections cannot be detached based
upon circumstances, the Court created “a gap in the protection
afforded by the Convention,”238 in which jurisdiction exists in
circumstances of effective overall control vis-à-vis military
occupation, but obligations do not exist in instances where member-
states take extraterritorial action short of military occupation. 
Another unanswered question left in the wake of Bankoviƒ and
other decisions on extraterritoriality is the degree of importance to
which the extraterritorial act in question occurred in a Council of
Europe member-state or the territory of a non-member. In Cyprus,
the Court noted the integral nature of the Convention in protecting
human rights in Europe, and that by depriving those protections to
an area that had formally enjoyed those protections, the purpose of
the Convention would be subverted.239 The Bankoviƒ Court partially
premised its decision on the distinction between Turkish-occupied
Cyprus and Yugoslavia, the former having been a signatory to the
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240. Bankoviƒ, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. at 358-359 (distinguishing Yugoslavia from Cyprus
based on its membership status in the Council of Europe).
241. Öcalan, 37 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 253 (outlining events prior to Öcalan’s arrest).
242. Issa, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 31821/96 at 2-3 (describing alleged events which occurred
during a Turkish military incursion in Iraq).
243. Öcalan, 37 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 253 (recognizing that the arrest of Öcalan occurred on
an airplane in Nairobi Airport).
244. Id. at 276 (finding that Kenyan authorities had de facto cooperated with Turkey in
Öcalan’s arrest, and that no violation of Kenyan sovereignty had occurred).
245. Id. at 274.
Directly after he had been handed over by the Kenyan officials to the
Turkish officials the applicant was under effective Turkish authority and
was therefore brought within the “jurisdiction” of that State for the
purposes of [Article] 1 of the Convention, even though in this instance
Turkey exercised its authority outside its territory.
Id.
246. Id. at 274-75.
The Court considers that the circumstances of the present case are
distinguishable from those in the aforementioned Bankoviƒ [and Others]
case, notably in that the applicant was physically forced to return to
Turkey by Turkish officials and was subject to their authority and
control following his arrest and return to Turkey.
Id.
247. Orna Ben-Naftali & Yuval Shany, Living in Denial: The Application of Human Rights
Convention and the latter having not.240 However, in Öcalan, the
act in question — the arrest of Mr. Öcalan — occurred in an
international area of Nairobi’s airport.241 Additionally, in Issa,
which contrary to Bankoviƒ was found admissible, the impugned
acts in question occurred in Iraq, which is obviously not a Council
of Europe member.242 The importance of locale to the Court’s case
law on extraterritoriality remains a significant, albeit not fully
examined, issue.
The Öcalan judgment, however, may offer some explanation to
these unanswered questions. In regards to the significance of the
location of the impugned act, it must again be noted that Turkey’s
arrest of Öcalan occurred in an international area of Nairobi’s
airport.243 However, neglecting the fact that the arrest took place in
an international area, the Court instead focused on the question of
whether Turkey’s actions had violated the sovereignty of Kenya,
and found that it had not — making Öcalan’s arrest permissible
under the Convention.244 Perhaps more importantly, the Court
found that Turkey did maintain an obligation to the Convention
because of its clear control over the circumstances.245 The Court’s
analysis, thus, seems to place an emphasis on the factual question
of degree of control, rather than on location. Turkish security forces
clearly had control over Öcalan by virtue of his arrest and
detention.246 The Court therefore seems to recognize that Turkey’s
degree of control over Öcalan was greater than the control NATO
exercised over Yugoslavia’s airspace in Bankoviƒ.247
196 J. TRANSNATIONAL LAW & POLICY [Vol. 14:2
in the Occupied Territories, 73 ISRAEL L. REV. (forthcoming Spring 2005), available at
http://www2.colman.ac.il/law/concord/publications/livingindenial.pdf (last visited Mar. 3,
2005) (critiquing the Bankoviƒ and Öcalan cases but asserting in relation to the Court’s
reasoning in Öcalan that “[p]erhaps the Court attributed importance to the intensity of
physical control exercised by Turkish officials over Öcalan, which clearly surpassed the level
of physical control exercised by NATO forces flying over Belgrade”). 
248. Committee Report, supra note 235, § VI ¶ 48.
249. See Ben-Naftali & Shany, supra note 247 (asserting that “[i]t should further be noted
in this context that the restrictive approach embraced by the Court in Bankoviƒ was
somewhat revised in the Öcalan case”).
250. See supra Part III.B for a discussion of the northern Cyprus cases.
251. See supra Part III.D for a discussion of Bankoviƒ.
252. See supra Part IV.B for a discussion of Öcalan.
253. See Lawson, supra note 237, at 19 (discussing the implications of Loizidou and
Bankoviƒ in regards to British military operations in Iraq).
In the wider sense, Bankoviƒ and Öcalan contradict each other
— both involving extraterritorial acts committed by Council of
Europe member-states, but the former declared inadmissible for
lack of jurisdiction, and the latter declared admissible and decided.
The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe has
recognized this conflict: “Issa and Öcalan suggest that a [High
Contracting Party] must secure the Convention rights and freedoms
to the extent that it can when performing an operation in a third
country, but Bankoviƒ expressly points in the opposite direction.”248
In a narrower sense, Öcalan re-affirms one aspect of Bankoviƒ by
requiring that a certain degree of control must be found to exist in
order for the Convention’s obligations to extend to extraterritorial
acts of Council of Europe states.249 
Despite the unanswered questions from Bankoviƒ, Öcalan, and
related cases about the degree of control required for Convention
jurisdiction to exist, what is known is that member-states
conducting actions outside of the Council of Europe will be obligated
to adhere to the European Convention on Human Rights if such
control is found to exist. Loizidou and Cyprus indicate that such
control exists by virtue of a military occupation.250 Bankoviƒ
indicates that use of precision-targeted air strikes does not amount
to such control.251 Finally, Öcalan indicates that the threshold of
control is met if the security forces of a member-state conduct an
arrest and detention of an individual.252 The continuing
development of this case law comes at an ample and pressing time,
as the United Kingdom — a member-state to the Council of Europe
and the Convention on Human Rights — has been conducting
military operations in Iraq since March of 2003.253 In a ground-
breaking decision in May of 2004, the High Court of Justice of
England and Wales ordered a hearing on England’s European
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254. Richard Norton-Taylor, Families Win Hearing on Deaths, THE GUARDIAN (London),
May 12, 2004 (discussing a High Court ruling to hear a case against Britain for deaths of
Iraqis allegedly shot or beaten to death by British forces), available at LEXIS, European
News Sources File.
255. Human Rights Act, 1998 (Eng.).
256. DONALD W. JACKSON, THE UNITED KINGDOM CONFRONTS THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION
ON HUMAN RIGHTS 1 (1997) (asserting that the United Kingdom violated the Convention
twenty-three times in the stated period, and that “measured both by the number of
complaints before the Court and by the violations found, it was the most frequent offender”).
257. Id. at 126-27 (describing Professor Jackson’s search results for ECHR references in
English court decisions).
258. Lammy Betten, Introduction, in The HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 1998: WHAT IT MEANS 1, 1-6,
(Lammy Betten ed., 1999) (discussing debate and implications for the UK’s adoption of the
Human Rights Act); Clare Dyer, Human Rights Law: Bringing Home the Basics, THE
GUARDIAN (London), Nov. 12, 1998 (outlining implications of the Human Rights Act for UK
law), available at LEXIS, European News Sources File; Frances Gibb, Rights Act will Allow
Judges to Shape our Lives, THE TIMES (London), Oct. 27, 1998 (discussing debate over the
role and adequacy of English judges to interpret the Human Rights Act), available at LEXIS,
European News Sources File.
259. Human Rights Act, 1998, sched. 1, art. 2 (Eng.).
260. Id. art. 5.
261. Id. art. 6.
262. Id. art. 9.
263. Id. § 2(1)(a) (Introduction).
Convention on Human Rights obligations in regards to the alleged
deaths of Iraqi civilians at the hands of British military forces.254
VI.  THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT OF 1998
Not only is the United Kingdom bound by the European
Convention of Human Rights as a convention party and member-
state to the Council of Europe, it has also incorporated virtually all
of the Convention rights and protections into statutory law vis-à-vis
the Human Rights Act.255 The Act will theoretically decrease the
amount of cases involving the United Kingdom that will go before
the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. The United
Kingdom is certainly no stranger to the Court as a party to previous
cases. From 1959-1989, the United Kingdom was found to have
violated the Convention twenty-three times.256 In its own courts,
judicial references to the European Convention have appeared over
150 times.257 The Human Rights Act itself was finally passed after
considerable debate about its implications for the UK.258
The Act includes the major Convention rights to life,259 liberty
and security;260 fair trial;261 and freedom of thought, conscience and
religion.262 The Act dictates that United Kingdom courts must take
into account European Court rulings on human rights.263 The two
significant omissions from the Convention are the absence of
articles 1 and 13 regarding obligations to uphold the Act’s
protections within the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom and to
198 J. TRANSNATIONAL LAW & POLICY [Vol. 14:2
264. See Human Rights Act, 1998, sched. 2 (Eng.) (including Convention articles 2-12 and
14-18).
265. 585 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (1997-98) 419 available at http://www.
publications.parliament.uk (last visited Mar. 2, 2005).
266. Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 8 (Eng.) (“In relation to any act (or proposed act) of a
public authority which the court finds is (or would be) unlawful, it may grant such relief or
remedy, or make such order, within its powers as it considers just and appropriate.”),
available at http://www.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts1998/19980042.htm (last visited Mar. 2, 2005).
267. See 584 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (1997-98) 1266-67.
My Lords, I have not the least idea what the remedies the courts might
develop outside Clause 8 could be if Article 13 was included. The noble
and learned Lord has really made my point for me. Clause 8(1) is of the
widest amplitude. No one is contending that it will not do the job. When
we have challenged the proponents of the amendment on a number of
occasions in Committee to say how Clause 8 might not do the job, they
have been unable to offer a single example. Therefore, the argument is
all one way. What we have done is sufficient.
Id.
268. Convention for Human Rights, supra note 14, art. 5 (declaring that “[e]veryone has the
right to liberty and security of person” unless lawful processes have been enacted to arrest
and detain individuals).
269. Human Rights Act, 1998, sched. 3, § 1 (Eng.), available at http://www.hmso.gov.uk
(last visited Mar. 2, 2005).
The Government found it necessary in 1974 to introduce and since then,
in cases concerning persons reasonably suspected of involvement in
terrorism connected with the affairs of Northern Ireland, or of certain
offences under the legislation, who have been detained for 48 hours, to
exercise powers enabling further detention without charge, for periods
of up to five days, on the authority of the Secretary of State.
Id.
provide an effective remedy for proven wrongs.264  In parliamentary
debate, it was recognized that these Convention articles could be
removed due to redundancy, as they were “in effect giving our
domestic courts the jurisdiction relating to the rights and freedoms
guaranteed under the European Convention on Human Rights.”265
In addition, clause 8 of the Act, which enables domestic courts to
provide remedies to unlawful acts,266 was thought to be sufficient
enough to exclude the Convention’s wording.267 
In another noteworthy departure from the European
Convention, the United Kingdom has officially reserved a right to
derogate from certain Convention obligations in the Human Rights
Act, particularly in regards to alleged terrorist activities. Its
principle derogation relates to the Convention’s Article 5 obligations
in regards to securing individual liberty.268 The United Kingdom
had enacted police powers to arrest and detain individuals without
charge for a period of time in its operations against Irish
Republican Army (IRA) terrorist activity, and reserved a continuing
right to do so in its derogation of Convention obligations in the
Human Rights Act.269 Despite the European Court of Human Rights
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270. Brogan and Others v. The United Kingdom, 11 Eur. H.R. Rep 117 (1988).
271. Id. 131-36.
272. Human Rights Act, 1998, amend. 2, order 2001 (Eng.), available at http://www.hmso.
gov.uk (last visited Mar. 2, 2005).
As a result of the public emergency, provision is made in the Anti-
terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, inter alia, for an extended power
to arrest and detain a foreign national which will apply where it is
intended to remove or deport the person from the United Kingdom but
where removal or deportation is not for the time being possible, with the
consequence that the detention would be unlawful under existing
domestic law powers. The extended power to arrest and detain will apply
where the Secretary of State issues a certificate indicating his belief that
the person's presence in the United Kingdom is a risk to national
security and that he suspects the person of being an international
terrorist.
Id.
273. Convention for Human Rights, supra note 14, art. 15.
1. In time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the
nation any High Contracting Party may take measures derogating from
its obligations under this Convention to the extent strictly required by
the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not
inconsistent with its other obligations under international law. 
2. No derogation from Article 2, except in respect of deaths resulting
from lawful acts of war, or from Articles 3, 4 (paragraph 1) and 7 shall be
made under this provision. 
3. Any High Contracting Party availing itself of this right of derogation
shall keep the Secretary General of the Council of Europe fully informed
of the measures which it has taken and the reasons therefor. It shall also
inform the Secretary General of the Council of Europe when such
measures have ceased to operate and the provisions of the Convention
are again being fully executed. 
Id.
274. Id. 
1988 judgment in Brogan and Others v. The United Kingdom,270
finding that the UK had violated Article 5 protections after
detaining alleged terrorist suspects for several days without
adhering to Convention obligations,271 the UK has continued to
reserve this power, and has moved to expand this derogation in
regards to arresting foreign nationals in the wake of the 9/11
terrorist attacks.272 It should be recognized, however, that even
though derogations of Article 5 protections are permissible in
certain circumstances, there are four Convention principles deemed
so important that they cannot be derogated from in any
circumstances.273 These include the Convention Article 2 right to
life “except in respect of deaths resulting from lawful acts of war,”
Article 3 prohibition of torture, Article 4 prohibition of slavery, and
Article 7 prohibition of criminal penalties for non-criminal acts.274
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275. David S. Cloud, et al., Red Cross Found Widespread Abuse of Iraqi Prisoners;
Confidential Report Says Agency Briefed U.S. Officials on Concerns Repeatedly, WALL ST. J.,
May 7, 2004, at A1; David S. Cloud, Red Cross Cited Detainee Abuse Over a Year Ago; Agency
Filed Complaints About Abu Ghraib Prison Months Before U.S. Probe, WALL ST. J., May 10,
2004, at A1.
276. Press Release, International Committee of the Red Cross, Iraq: ICRC explains position
over detention report and treatment of prisoners (May 8, 2004) (asserting that ICRC “reports
carry a specific mention that they are strictly confidential and intended only for the
authorities to which they are presented. . . . As already indicated this report was, however,
released without our consent”), available at http://www.icrc.org (last visited Mar. 2, 2005).
277. Id. (“[T]his report includes observations and recommendations from visits that took
place between March and November 2003. The report itself was handed over to the Coalition
Forces (CF) in February of 2004.”).
278. INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS (ICRC) ON THE TREATMENT BY THE COALITION FORCES OF
PRISONERS OF WAR AND OTHER PROTECTED PERSONS BY THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS IN IRAQ
DURING ARREST, INTERNMENT AND INTERROGATION (Feb. 2004) [hereinafter ICRC REPORT].
279. Id. ¶ 25 (outlining “methods of ill-treatment most frequently alleged during
interrogation”). Public disclosure of these allegations of prisoner abuse is most frequently
credited to an article published by the New Yorker days before the ICRC report was leaked
to the Wall Street Journal. See Seymour Hersh, Torture at Abu Ghraib, THE NEW YORKER,
May 10, 2004, available at http://www.newyorker.com (last visited Mar. 2, 2005). 
280. Public Interest Lawyers, Iraq Litigation, available at http://www.
publicinterestlawyers.co.uk (last visited Mar. 2, 2005) (describing cases brought by Iraqi
families against the United Kingdom). 
VII.  THE DETENTION AND DEATH OF BAHA MOUSA
The cases before the High Court of England and Wales
originated from alleged human rights violations committed by
British military forces in Iraq. The alleged violations were reported
in an International Red Cross report that was leaked to the Wall
Street Journal and reported in early May of 2004.275 The
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) asserted its
displeasure with the public disclosure of the previously confidential
report.276 It also claimed that the report was communicated to the
Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) of Iraq in February of 2004,
and was based on information gathered throughout 2003.277 The 24-
page report was based on interviews with Iraqi detainees and other
witnesses, and concluded that CPA forces had allegedly engaged in
widespread abuse of prisoners that violated international human
rights law.278 The ICRC reported that the most frequent forms of
alleged abuses by CPA forces included prolonged hooding of
detainees; beatings with guns and other objects; psychological
abuse; sleep, food, and water deprivation; sexual humiliation; and
other forms of maltreatment.279 
British lawyers have now filed cases against the United
Kingdom triggered by the ICRC report and other accounts.280 These
cases involve circumstances in which British soldiers allegedly shot
and killed Iraqis while in their homes, cars, or other public
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281. Id. (describing the cases of Hazim Jum’aa Gatteh Al-Skeini — shot during a funeral;
Hannan Mahaibas Saeed Shmailawi — shot while eating dinner in her home; Muhammad
Abdul Ridha Salim — shot while at a family member’s home; Waleed Fayayi Muzban — shot
from behind while driving).
282. ICRC REPORT, supra note 278, ¶ 16 (describing arrest of Baha Mousa and others on
September 13, 2003).
283. Id.
284. Rory McCarthy, “They were kicking us, laughing. It was a great pleasure for them,”
THE GUARDIAN (London), Feb. 21, 2004, (describing witness accounts of men arrested at a
Basra hotel by PCA forces), available at LEXIS, European News Sources File.
285. Id. (describing witness accounts in which British soldiers repeatedly kicked detainees
and forced them to dance “like Michael Jackson”).
286. Id. (describing medical reports alleging kidney failure and severe beatings).
287. Id. (“Since then [Mousa’s father] has accepted $3,000 (about £1,600) as part of a
compensation payment for his son’s death.”).
places.281 One case involves the alleged beating to death of an Iraqi
man while in detention. As noted in the ICRC report, the man,
earlier identified as Baha Mousa, was detained by British soldiers
along with others who had raided the Basra hotel he worked at.282
According to the report:
[The detained men] were made to kneel, face and
hands against the ground, as if in a prayer position.
The soldiers stamped on the back of the neck of those
raising their head. . . . The suspects were taken to Al-
Hakiyima, a former office previously used by the
[Iraqi Intelligence Service] in Basrah and then
beaten severely by CF personnel. One of the
arrestees died following the ill-treatment . . . . Prior
to his death, his co-arrestees heard him screaming
and asking for assistance. 
The issued “International Death Certificate”
mentioned “Cardio-respiratory arrest-asphyxia” as
the condition directly leading to the death.283
According to witness accounts reported earlier, witnesses alleged
that Mousa and others were arrested by British soldiers, bound
with flexi-cuffs, hooded, and severely beaten.284 The detained men
were repeatedly kicked in their kidneys and forced to dance.285
Various medical documents reported that Mousa and the other
detained men were seriously beaten after arrest.286 The family of
Mousa accepted $3,000.00 in compensation for his death.287
Mousa’s family and others then disputed a government “policy
decision” to not conduct an independent inquiry into his death and
deaths of others allegedly committed by British soldiers, and they
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288. Iraqi Families Win Right to Challenge Government, THE GUARDIAN (London), May 11,
2004 (reporting a High Court decision to conduct a full hearing on the alleged killings),
available at LEXIS, European News Sources File.
289. Karen McVeigh, Relatives of Dead Iraqis Win High Court Challenge, THE SCOTSMAN
(Edinburgh), May 12, 2004, available at LEXIS, European News Sources File. 
290. Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 2 (Eng.), available at http://www.hmso.gov.uk (last visited
Mar. 2, 2005).
291. Convention for Human Rights, supra note 14, art. 3 (“No one shall be subjected to
torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”).
292. Ireland v. The United Kingdom, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 25 (1978).
293. Id. at 35 (“The situation worsened in 1970. The number of explosions recorded by the
police jumped dramatically from a total of eight in 1969 to 155 in 1970. Some explosions were
caused by Loyalists . . . but there is no dispute that the majority were the work of the IRA.”).
294. Id. at 50.
295. Id. at 51-57 (describing special powers regulations enacted by the government of
Northern Ireland).
296. Id. at 51 (noting the UK’s official notification of derogation to the European
Convention six times in the 1970s).
won the right to a full hearing over the matter before the High
Court of England and Wales.288 Lawyers for the families have
acknowledged that jurisdiction vis-à-vis the Human Rights Act and
European Convention is “[t]he crucial issue the High Court must
decide.”289 It should be noted again that by incorporating the
European Convention’s principles via the Human Rights Act, the
United Kingdom’s courts now “must take into account” European
Court of Human Rights case law.290 The remainder of this Article
will provide an overview of European Court of Human Rights case
law supporting the argument that the United Kingdom does
maintain extraterritorial jurisdiction over its forces in Iraq, and
more importantly, that the death of Mousa and torture of other
Iraqis violates the European Convention’s Article 3 prohibition of
torture and Article 2 right to life.  
VIII.  THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND ARTICLE 3:
IRELAND, TOMASI, RIBITSCH, AND SELMOUNI 
The landmark court case involving Convention violations of
Article 3291 was Ireland v. The United Kingdom, decided in 1978.292
In response to terrorist activity by both the IRA and loyalist
forces,293 the government of Northern Ireland enacted special
powers to arrest and detain individuals in order to prevent
terrorism.294 These powers enabled authorities to arrest individuals
without warrant and traditional due process rights for detention
and interrogation for varied periods of time, including
indefinitely.295 The United Kingdom notified the Council of Europe
of their intention to derogate from the Convention in order to
exercise these powers.296
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297. Id. at 38 (outlining the arrest of some 350 individuals in an operation “directed against
the IRA organisation as a whole”).
298. Ireland, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 59.
299. Id. (outlining interrogation techniques used by government forces of alleged IRA
detainees).
300. Id. at 61-70 (describing allegations of mistreatment of detainees).
301. Id. at 79 (noting that “ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of severity if it is to
fall within the scope of Article 3").
302. Id. (“The Convention prohibits in absolute terms torture and inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment, irrespective of the victim’s conduct.”).
303. Id. at 79-80.
304. Id. at 79-85.
305. Id. at 107.
306. Tomasi v. France, 241 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1993).
307. Id. at 9.
In 1971, the United Kingdom’s security forces initiated
Operation Demetrius — a wide-scale operation in which hundreds
of suspected IRA members were detained and interrogated by the
Royal Ulster Constabulary.297 Although the majority of detainees
were released within several days, a number of detainees were held
for “‘interrogation in depth.’”298 Five general categories of
interrogation techniques were employed by government forces in
interrogation:  1) “wall-standing” (keeping detainees in “‘stress
positions’” for prolonged periods of time); 2) hooding; 3) prolonged
exposure to loud noise; 4) sleep deprivation; and 5) food and water
deprivation.299 In addition to these conditions, detained individuals
alleged that a variety of acts of maltreatment were committed
against them, including severe beatings.300
The Court noted that Article 3 maltreatment exists upon a
finding that a level of severity has been reached as determined by
the factual circumstances at hand.301 It also reaffirmed the principle
that Article 3 could not be derogated from in any form or in any
circumstances.302 The Court then recognized that the five
interrogation techniques did comprise “inhuman treatment”
outlawed by the Convention.303 Reviewing allegations by detainees
at several different holding locations, the Court found that this
pattern of inhuman treatment of detainees was practiced in many,
although not all, detention centers.304 The Court thus held that the
use of the five interrogation techniques did amount to a violation of
Article 3 by the United Kingdom.305 
Since Ireland, a number of cases have spoken specifically
towards Article 3 violations committed by government forces
against detainees. Tomasi v. France306 concerned the detention of
a Corsican separatist who had allegedly participated in an attack
against a French military garrison.307 Tomasi was arrested and kept
in police custody for forty-eight hours, and alleged that he had been
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308. Id. at 19-20 (outlining Tomasi’s interrogation and alleged maltreatment).
309. Id. at 20-22 (outlining results of medical examinations performed by doctors and
finding that the lesions were “consistent with Mr. Tomasi’s declarations but could equally
have a different traumatic origin”).
310. Id. at 30 (citing the Court of Cassation’s conclusions that furthering Tomasi’s case
would be “pointless”). 
311. Tomasi, 241 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 32 (finding Tomasi’s case admissible for review
of Article 3, Article 5, and Article 6 claims). 
312. Id. at 40 (noting the Government’s position that “excluded any presumption of the
existence of a causal connection” between Tomasi’s injuries and his detention).
313. Id. at 42.
314. Ribitsch v. Austria, 336 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1995).
315. Id. at 8-9.
316. Id. at 9.
beaten and maltreated during his interrogation.308 Doctors
appointed by French judicial officials confirmed after medical
examination that he had sustained various lesions that may be
consistent with his allegations.309 However, the French court
removed the case on the grounds that it was impossible to prove
with certainty that his alleged beating was conducted while he was
in detention, as police had expressly denied any such actions.310
Tomasi then applied to the European Court with Article 3 and other
claims, which were admitted for review.311
The Court noted France’s argument that although Tomasi did
sustain apparent injuries, it was impossible to prove that a causal
link existed implicating police for his injuries.312 Notwithstanding
the absence of proof indicating that Tomasi’s injuries were
sustained while in detention, the Court found it “sufficient to
observe that the medical certificates and reports, drawn up in total
independence by medical practitioners, attest to the large number
of blows inflicted on Mr[.] Tomasi and their intensity,” and
subsequently held that his treatment was inhuman and degrading
and therefore in violation of Article 3.313 Tomasi indicated that even
in the absence of evidence proving a direct link between
maltreatment and the actions of government agents, a significant
body of evidence showing that maltreatment may have occurred in
detention is sufficient to find a violation of Article 3.   
The case of Ribitsch v. Austria further developed how the Court
would treat evidence of maltreatment in detention.314 Ribitsch was
an alleged drug dealer who had been apprehended by police in the
investigation of heroin overdose-related deaths.315 After his release
from detention, a medical examination indicated that he had
several bruises and “symptoms characteristic of a cervical
syndrome, [and] that he was suffering from vomiting and a violent
headache.”316 Ribitsch claimed that he was repeatedly beaten
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317. Id. (describing differing accounts of Ribitsch’s detention).
318. Id. at 18-19 (citing a medical examination by a forensic expert).
319. Ribitsch, 336 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 20-22.
320. Id. at 24.
321. Id. at 25-26.
322. Id.
323. Id. at 26.
324. Ribitsch, 336 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 25-26 (concluding that Austria was in violation
of Article 3).
325. Selmouni v. France, 1999-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 149.
326. Id. at 160-63.
327. Id. at 159-60 (citing medical reports of Selmouni’s condition during his detention).
during his interrogation, but police claimed his injuries were caused
after he slipped while getting out of a police car.317
As in Tomasi, medical examination showed that Ribitsch had
sustained injuries, but because it was impossible to conclude that
they were a result of an alleged beating in detention absent other
evidence,318 he lost his case before an Austrian court.319 Before the
European Court’s review of Ribitsch’s Article 3 claim, Austria
argued that alleged beating and injuries by government agents
must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.320 The Court, however,
came to another conclusion. Noting that it was “not disputed that
Mr[.] Ribitsch’s injuries were sustained during his detention in
police custody,”321 the Court found that Austria was “accordingly
under an obligation to provide a plausible explanation of how the
applicant’s injuries were caused.”322 The Court also noted the
“particular vulnerability” of Ribitsch as an individual detained by
government agents.323 Because it did not find it plausible that his
injuries were caused by slipping out of a police car door, and in the
absence of another explanation, the Court found Austria had
violated Ribitsch’s Article 3 rights.324 Ribitsch indicates that not
only will an Article 3 violation be found in the absence of direct
proof establishing a link between government conduct and injuries
sustained in detention, but places a positive obligation on
governments to provide a suitable explanation for injuries in the
absence of such evidence.
The case of Selmouni v. France325 is also a notable development
of the European Convention’s Article 3 case law. After being
detained by French police for suspected drug-trafficking, Selmouni
alleged that he was repeatedly punched, beaten with a bat, urinated
on, sodomized with a baton, and threatened with blow torches and
forced injection of a syringe by the police.326 Medical examination
conducted during his period of interrogation indicated that he had
sustained lesions throughout his head and body that “corresponds
to the period of [Selmouni’s] police custody.”327 Unlike in Tomasi
and Ribitsch, a French domestic court found four police officers
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328. Id. at 170-72 (noting the decision of the Versailles Court of Appeals).
329. Id. (outlining the sentencing of the four police officers).
330. Selmouni, 1999-V Eur. Ct. H.R. at 181.
331. Id. at 183 (outlining Selmouni’s physical abuse and exposure to “heinous and
humiliating” acts).
332. See supra notes 292-305 and accompanying text for a discussion of Ireland.
333. Convention for Human Rights, supra note 14, art. 3 (“No one shall be subjected to
torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”).
334. Selmouni, 1999-V Eur. Ct. H.R. at 181 (quoting the United Nations Convention
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment). 
335. Id. at 183-84 (finding a violation of Article 3’s prohibition of torture).
336. The government of Turkey had previously been found in violation of Article 3’s
prohibition against torture. See, e.g., Aydin v. Turkey, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. 251, 295-97 (1998)
(violation of Article 3’s prohibition of torture for beating, sexual humiliation, rape, and use
of a water hose on a Kurdish woman by Turkish security officials).
337. McCann and Others v. United Kingdom, 324 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1995).  
guilty of assault.328 Three of the police officers were sentenced to
twelve- to fifteen-month suspended imprisonments, and the
commanding officer to eighteen months of imprisonment, fifteen of
which were suspended.329
In the European Court’s consideration of the case, it noted that
“[e]ven in the most difficult circumstances, such as the fight against
terrorism and organised crime, the Convention prohibits in absolute
terms torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment.”330 Relying on the medical examinations conducted
during Selmouni’s detention, the Court found that he had suffered
extreme physical injuries.331 Unlike in Ireland, where the Court had
found that the United Kingdom had violated Article 3 by causing
inhuman treatment,332 it examined whether the police conduct in
the instant case amounted to the more egregious level of torture
prohibited by the same article.333 Citing the United Nations
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, which defines torture as “‘any
act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental,
is intentionally inflicted,’”334 the Court found that the police conduct
did amount to torture.335 France thus became the first Western
European nation to be found in violation of the Convention’s
prohibition against torture.336
IX.  THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND ARTICLE 2:
MCCANN, ÇAKICI, TIMURTAÔ, AND VELIKOVA
Significant Article 2 case law of the Convention began in claims
brought against the United Kingdom. McCann and Others v. The
United Kingdom337 was the first European Court case to focus on an
intentional killing and alleged violation of Article 2, which
Spring, 2005]           LAWLESS AREAS OF EUROPE 207
338. Convention for Human Rights, supra note 14, art. 2.
1. Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be
deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a
court following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is
provided by law.
2. Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention
of this article when it results from the use of force which is no more than
absolutely necessary:
a.in defence of any person from unlawful violence;
b.in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of
a person lawfully detained;
c.in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or
insurrection.
Id. 
339. McCann, 324 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 11-12 (describing orders of SAS members to
arrest an IRA active service unit in Gibraltar).
340. Id. at 14 (describing an intelligence briefing by SAS in regards to the possible actions
of Daniel McCann, Sean Savage, and Mairead Farrell). 
341. Id. at 21 (describing a brief examination of a car believed to be holding a bomb).
342. Id. at 22-23 (describing observations of the three IRA suspects by SAS agents).
343. Id. at 23 (describing the shooting of Daniel McCann).
344. McCann, 324 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 23-24 (describing the shooting of Mairead
Farrell).
345. Id. at 27 (describing the shooting of Sean Savage).
346. Id. at 30 (“After the shooting, the bodies of the three suspects and Farrell’s handbag
were searched. No weapons or detonating devices were discovered.”).
347. Id. (“The bomb-disposal team opened the suspect white Renault car but found no
explosive device or bomb.”).
348. Id. at 31 (describing the discovery of explosives in a car rented by Mairead Farrell
under the pseudonym of Katharine Smith).
enshrines the basic right to life.338 In McCann, members of British
military Special Air Services (SAS) were detached to Gibraltar in
order to arrest three IRA members.339 The SAS believed that the
IRA members were planning to detonate a car bomb near a military
ceremony.340 The SAS and local police tracked the three suspects to
an area within the proximity of the military ceremony and
identified what they believed to be “a ‘suspect car bomb.’”341
The SAS agents followed the three suspects walking away from
the car.342 Believing that they were about to detonate the car bomb,
the agents shot one suspect after he allegedly reached across his
front side in a rapid manner for a presumed detonation device.343
They then shot the other suspect after she allegedly reached for her
handbag for a presumed weapon or detonation device.344 The third
suspect was also shot after he was seen reaching for a jacket
pocket.345 All three suspects were then searched and no weapons or
detonation devices were found.346 The vehicle identified as the
suspect car bomb was also searched and no bomb was found.347
However, an explosive device was later found in a car rented by one
of the suspects.348 Family members of the deceased IRA members
later challenged the United Kingdom in both Gibraltar and
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349. McCann, 324 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 31-38 (describing proceedings of the applicants
failed challenges against the United Kingdom in both Gibraltar and Northern Ireland). 
350. Id. at 45 (outlining the applicant’s Convention challenges alleging a violation of Article
2).
351. Id. at 45-46 (“It must also be borne in mind that, as a provision which not only
safeguards the right to life but sets out the circumstances when the deprivation of life may
be justified, Article 2 ranks as one of the most fundamental provisions in the Convention.”).
352. Id. at 46 (“[T]he use of the term ‘absolutely necessary’ in Article 2 § 2 indicates that
a stricter and more compelling test of necessity must be employed from that normally
applicable when determining whether State action is ‘necessary in a democratic society.’”).
353. Id. 
354. McCann, 324 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 51-52 (finding no evidence that the shootings
were planned in advance as a form of intentional assassination). 
355. Id. at 57-58 (reviewing the actions of the SAS soldiers prior to the shootings).
356. Id. at 58-59.
The Court accepts that the soldiers honestly believed, in the light of the
information that they had been given, as set out above, that it was
necessary to shoot the suspects in order to prevent them from detonating
a bomb and causing serious loss of life . . . . The actions which they took,
in obedience to superior orders, were thus perceived by them as
absolutely necessary in order to safeguard innocent lives. 
It considers that the use of force by agents of the State in pursuit
of one of the aims delineated in paragraph 2 of Article 2 of the
Convention may be justified under this provision where it is based on an
Northern Ireland and lost their cases.349 They then sued the UK,
alleging a violation of Article 2, on the grounds that the use of
lethal force and their subsequent deaths “were not absolutely
necessary.”350
In determining whether or not the United Kingdom had violated
Article 2, the Court first noted that the prohibition against the
taking of life by government forces was not absolute, but could be
permitted under very strict conditions.351 A determination of
whether or not a violation had occurred must take into account
whether or not it was “‘absolutely necessary’” to intentionally take
life, given the factual circumstances of the situation.352 An
examination of such circumstances includes not only a review of the
government force’s actions, but a wider scrutiny of “the planning
and control of the actions under examination.”353
Focusing on the actions of the SAS agents, the Court found no
evidence that the killings of the three IRA members were
premeditated acts.354 Furthermore, although it was later found that
none of the suspects had weapons or explosive detonators on them,
the Court recognized that SAS agents were acting under a
reasonable belief that they did have such items with them and were
imminently prepared to use them.355 Given such considerations, the
Court found that the shootings were justifiable since the agents
were acting under the belief that they were about to prevent the
taking of innocent lives, and that their actions themselves did not
amount to a violation of Article 2.356
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honest belief which is perceived, for good reasons, to be valid at the time
but which subsequently turns out to be mistaken. . . .
It follows that, having regard to the dilemma confronting the
authorities in the circumstances of the case, the actions of the soldiers
do not, in themselves, give rise to a violation of this provision.
Id.
357. Id. at 59-60 (noting the failure to arrest the suspects prior to their shootings).
358. Id. at 61-62 (discussing considerations as to whether or not the use of lethal force was
absolutely necessary).
359. McCann, 324 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 62.
360. Id. (“Accordingly, the court finds that there has been a breach of Article 2 of the
Convention.”).
361. See supra Part VIII.
362. Çakici v. Turkey, 1999-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 583; see also Gobind Singh Sethi, The
European Court of Human Rights’ Jurisprudence on Issues of Forced Disappearances, 8 HUM.
RTS. BRIEF 29 (2001); Irum Taqi, Note, Adjudicating Disappearance Cases in Turkey: An
Argument for Adopting the Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ Approach, 24 FORDHAM
INT’L L.J. 940 (2001) (providing analyses of European Court of Human Rights examination
of “disappearance” cases involving Turkish operations against Kurdish separatist forces).
Both Sethi and Taqi provide a thorough overview of Çakici and other European Court of
Human Rights case law focusing on evidential issues related to alleged disappearances and
deaths of Kurds in Turkish custody.
However, in regards to the Article 2 obligations in the planning
and control of the SAS mission, the Court reached a different
conclusion. It noted that the situation in which the shootings
occurred could have been entirely preempted had the IRA members
been arrested prior to that day, upon their arrival in Gibraltar,
which was monitored by the government.357 It also concluded that
the security forces — with the knowledge that the SAS agents
would in all likelihood kill the IRA members if they believed they
were about to detonate a bomb — had an obligation to ensure that
their intelligence information was either entirely correct or
contained sufficient notice that there may not be enough of an
absolute need to resort to lethal force.358 Given these considerations,
the Court was “not persuaded that the killing of the three terrorists
constituted the use of force which was no more than absolutely
necessary in defence of persons from unlawful violence,”359 and
consequently found the United Kingdom in violation of Article 2.360
The McCann holding thus indicated how closely the Court would
scrutinize government use of lethal force, looking not only to the
actions of the government agents themselves, but also to the
planning and operationalization context to determine if lethal force
was absolutely necessary or could have been preempted. 
Since McCann, cases have developed combining Article 2 claims
with the factual circumstances of arrest and detention which
characterize the Article 3 cases discussed above.361 Several
illustrative cases originate from Turkish military operations
against the PKK. In Çakici v. Turkey,362 plaintiffs alleged that
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363. Çakici, 1999-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. at 593 (describing the plaintiffs’ allegations in regards
to Çakici’s disappearance).
364. Id. (describing the government’s arguments in regards to Çakici’s disappearance).
365. Id. at 599-601 (outlining the Commission’s findings).
366. Id. at 610 (holding that Turkey had a positive obligation to protect Çakici’s right to life
after detaining him). 
367. Çakici, 1999-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. at 610-11 (“As Ahmet Çakici must be presumed dead
following an unacknowledged detention by the security forces, the Court finds that the
responsibility of the respondent State for his death is engaged.”).
368. Id. at 611-12 (finding witness testimony credible enough to indicate that Turkey had
also violated Article 3 by torturing Çakici while he was detained).
369. TimurtaÕ v. Turkey, 2000-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 303.
370. Id. at 311-12 (describing the plaintiff’s allegations in regards to TimurtaÕ’
disappearance).
371. Id. at 313 (describing the government’s arguments in regards to TimurtaÕ’
disappearance).
372. Id. at 314 (describing a hearing of the Commission on Human Rights in which a
military report indicated that TimurtaÕ had been arrested and detained by the security
forces).
Çakici was taken into custody by Turkish forces from his village
and detained for an unknown period of time at several holding
facilities — where witnesses claimed to have seen him after he was
tortured.363 Turkey argued that they had never detained him and
that he had eluded security forces as a wanted PKK member until
he was allegedly found dead with dozens of other PKK fighters after
a clash with government forces.364 
The Council of Europe’s then fact-finding entity — the
Commission on Human Rights — concluded after an investigation,
involving interviews with several witnesses, that Çakici had been
detained by the security forces and was beaten on at least one
occasion.365 Noting Article 2 § 1’s requirement “that the right to life
be protected by law,” and that there was “sufficient circumstantial
evidence” showing that he had been detained by the government,
the Court found that Turkey had a positive obligation to protect his
life while in its custody.366 The Court subsequently found that
Turkey had violated Article 2’s obligation to protect the right to
life.367 It also found Turkey in violation of Article 3’s prohibition of
torture as well, deducing from witness testimony that Çakici was
tortured prior to his death.368
In TimurtaÕ v. Turkey,369 TimurtaÕ was allegedly apprehended
and detained by Turkish security forces from his village along with
several other men.370 Although the government denied that he had
ever been detained,371 evidence was provided that TimurtaÕ had
been detained and interrogated by Turkish forces.372 Citing to
Selmouni, the Court recognized that “where an individual is taken
into custody in good health but is found to be injured at the time of
release, it is incumbent on the State to provide a plausible
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373. Id. at 330.
374. TimurtaÕ, App. 2000-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. at 330 (holding that sufficient circumstantial
evidence can allow a conclusion that an individual has died in custody).
375. Id. at 330-31 (discussing the length of TimurtaÕ’ disappearance and noting “that the
more time goes by without any news of the detained person, the greater the likelihood that
he or she has died”).
376. Id. at 331-32 (finding a violation of Article 2 because TimurtaÕ was presumed to have
died during government custody). 
377. Velikova v. Bulgaria, 2000-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 1.
378. Id. at 9-10 (describing circumstances of Tsonchev’s arrest).
379. Id. at 10 (describing witness testimony that Tsonchev had been drunk at the time of
his arrest, but did not seem to be experiencing any medical problems).
380. Id. at 10-12 (describing police accounts of Tsonchev’s detention).
381. Id. at 12 (noting police testimonies as to the discovery of Tsonchev’s dead body).
382. Velikova, 2000-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. at 13-14.
383. Id. at 23 (noting that “the burden of proof may be regarded as resting on the
authorities to provide a satisfactory and convincing explanation” in regards to injuries or
deaths that occur in government custody). 
explanation of how those injuries were caused.”373 Citing Çakici, it
then noted that even if the detained individual’s body is not found,
circumstantial evidence can lead to a presumption of death in
custody.374 Because TimurtaÕº had been missing for over six years,
the length of his disappearance itself was a significant factor
indicating the likelihood that he had died in custody.375 As in
Çakici, the Court concluded that TimurtaÕ had died in “an
unacknowledged detention,” and that Turkey had thus violated
Article 2 for failing to protect his life while in custody.376  
In a 2000 case involving an alleged Article 2 violation while in
custody not involving a disappearance, the Court reviewed the
death of a Gypsy while in police custody in Velikova v. Bulgaria.377
In Velikova, Slavtcho Tsonchev was arrested by Bulgarian police for
allegedly being involved in the theft of cattle.378 At the time of his
arrest, Tsonchev had been drinking substantial amounts of alcohol
with friends.379 According to police reports, he was too drunk to be
questioned and was left in an arrest cell where he began vomiting
and allegedly fell on the ground due to being intoxicated.380 Later in
the night, Tsonchev was found dead at the police station.381 An
autopsy conducted the next day found numerous bruises on his face,
arms, and legs, and that “‘[t]he cause of Mr[.] Tsonchev’s death was
the acute loss of blood resulting from the large and deep
haematomas on the upper limbs and the left buttock . . . . The
injuries are the result of a blunt trauma.’”382 
The Court, again citing to Selmouni, restated the Convention
obligation to protect a detained individual’s health and safety while
in government custody under Article 2.383 It dismissed the
government’s claim that Tsonchev died from injuries caused by
falling while drunk, as the medical report indicated that his death
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384. Id. at 23-24 (reviewing evidence regarding Tsonchev’s death). 
385. Id. at 24 (“[T]here is sufficient evidence on which it may be concluded beyond
reasonable doubt that Mr. Tsonchev died as a result of injuries inflicted while he was in the
hands of the police. . . . The Court concludes, therefore, that there has been a violation of
Article 2.”).
386. See supra Part VII for a discussion of Baha Mousa’s death.
387. ICRC REPORT, supra note 278, ¶ 16 (describing arrest of Baha Mousa and others on
September 13, 2003).
388. Id. (describing conditions of detainment while in British custody); McCarthy, supra
note 284 (describing witness accounts of men arrested at a Basra hotel by PCA forces).
389. Ireland, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 79 (finding the interrogation techniques used by security
forces against IRA suspects to be violations of Article 3).
390. See supra notes 306-24 and accompanying text for a discussion of Tomasi and Ribitsch.
391. Ribitsch v. Austria, 336 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1995) 25-26 (recognizing Austria’s
obligation to provide a plausible explanation for injuries sustained while in police custody).
392. Selmouni v. France, 1999-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 149, 183-84 (finding that the conduct of
French police amounted to an Article 3 violation of the prohibition against torture).
393. See supra notes 362-76 and accompanying text for a discussion of Çakici and TimurtaÕ.
was due to blood loss caused by blunt trauma.384 It thus concluded
that Tsonchev died as a result of intentional injuries sustained
while he was in police custody, amounting to a violation of Article
2.385
X.  CONCLUSION:  ANOTHER LOOK AT THE CASE OF BAHA MOUSA
Revisiting the case of Baha Mousa,386 the European Court of
Human Rights’ Article 2 and Article 3 case law make it abundantly
clear that his torture and death violated both articles. Mousa and
others were arrested and taken into British custody.387 In detention,
the Iraqis were subjected to the identical treatment deemed illegal
in Ireland — hooding, forced stress positions, and beatings388 — as
violations of Article 3’s prohibition of inhuman treatment.389 Tomasi
and Ribitsch demonstrate the Court’s willingness to find Article 3
violations even in the absence of a causal link between injuries and
the state actors’ alleged conduct.390 Ribitsch also imposed an Article
3 obligation on the alleged state perpetrator to either safeguard an
individual while in custody or provide a plausible explanation for
injuries sustained in custody.391 As Mousa allegedly died as a result
of this treatment, it is arguable that the beatings he received rose
to the degree of severity recognized in Selmouni as torture.392 The
conduct of British forces would therefore amount to at least a
violation of Article 3’s prohibition of inhuman treatment and likely
a violation of its prohibition of torture.
The Turkish disappearance cases of Çakici and TimurtaÕ
indicate that even in the absence of direct evidence or even a body,
the Court will find an Article 2 violation of a state’s obligation to
protect life.393 Such a violation can be concluded on the basis of a
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394. TimurtaÕ v. Turkey, 2000-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 303, 330 (holding that sufficient
circumstantial evidence can allow a conclusion that an individual has died in custody).
395. ICRC REPORT, supra note 278, ¶ 16 (describing witness accounts of Mousa’s
maltreatment and death).
396. Velikova v. Bulgaria, 2000-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 24 (finding Bulgaria in violation of
Article 2 for the death of Tsonchev while in police custody).
397. TimurtaÕ, 2000-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. at 330.
398. See supra notes 337-61 and accompanying text for a discussion of McCann.
399. See supra notes 136-57 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Cyprus cases.
400. Bankoviƒ and Others v. Belgium and Others, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 333, 356-57
(ruling against the plaintiffs’ argument that NATO exerted control over Yugoslavia). 
401. Öcalan v. Turkey, 37 Eur. H.R. Rep. 238, 274-75 (holding that Turkey had jurisdiction
over Öcalan through his arrest).
sufficient amount of circumstantial evidence alone.394 In Mousa’s
case, it is not a situation in which circumstantial evidence alone
exists — on the contrary, his dead body was produced after having
been taken into custody.395 His case would therefore be analogous
to that in Velikova, where an Article 2 violation will be found upon
the death of an individual in state custody.396 Such a conclusion
would follow from the Court’s previously cited recognition “that
where an individual is taken into custody in good health but is
found to be injured at the time of release, it is incumbent on the
State to provide a plausible explanation of how those injuries were
caused.”397 Undoubtedly, there is no “plausible explanation” that
can be provided in regards to Mousa’s death in custody other than
that it was caused by the conduct of British military personnel
detaining him. In reference to the Court’s high degree of scrutiny
employed in McCann, it should also be clear that his death by
torture was by no means “absolutely necessary” to the furthering of
any legally acceptable ends.398 An Article 2 violation of the right to
life should thus be found in regards to Mousa’s death.
The critical question, of course, is whether the European
Convention will apply extraterritorially to the United Kingdom in
Iraq. The Court’s rulings in Loizidou and Cyprus indicate that
military occupation and effective control of another state imposes
an obligation on the occupying state to extend the protections of the
Convention on the occupied populace.399 Such effective control was
not found to exist in Bankoviƒ vis-à-vis NATO air strikes.400
Instead, the Öcalan judgment is factually analogous to Mousa’s
case, in which the Court found that Turkey had jurisdiction over
Öcalan through his arrest conducted by Turkish forces at Nairobi
Airport.401 Mousa’s arrest and detention should be recognized as a
deprivation of his individual liberty and establishment of effective
control over him by British military personnel. Therefore, the
European Convention should apply to the United Kingdom in Iraq
in Mousa’s case. 
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402. Status of the CPA, MNFI, Certain Missions and Personnel in Iraq, Coalition
Provisional Authority, Order No. 17, § 2 ¶ 1, available at http://www.iraqcoalition.org (last
visited Mar. 4, 2005). 
403. See id. § 2 ¶ 3; see also PUBLIC INTEREST LAWYERS, IRAQ LITIGATION, available at
http://www.publicinterestlawyers.co.uk (last visited Mar. 4, 2005) (“In the case of Iraq, the
argument for domestic accountability is made even stronger in light of the immunity afforded
to Coalition personnel (under Coalition Provisional Authority Order 17) from prosecution in
Iraqi courts. Such personnel enjoy complete immunity from criminal and civil liability under
Iraqi jurisdiction.”). 
404. Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 2 (Eng.).
405. See generally Ergi v. Turkey, 1998-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 1751 (finding an Article 2 violation
because of insufficient precautions to protect civilian life during a military operation).
A Convention remedy should especially exist because, upon the
occupation of Iraq, multinational military personnel of the Coalition
Provisional Authority of Iraq were deemed “immune from Iraqi
legal process.”402 Instead, coalition forces are “subject to the
exclusive jurisdiction of their Sending States.”403 Having adopted
the European Convention on Human Rights through the Human
Rights Act 1998 — which requires domestic courts to consider
European Court case law404 — the U.K. judiciary should review the
Mousa case, and related cases involving alleged human rights
violations by British forces, in reference to the European Court’s
case law. This article focuses on the Mousa case and the
Convention’s Article 2 and Article 3 case law as effective control
was established over Mousa through his arrest. However, it should
be noted that other Convention case law exists concerning Article
2 claims that may be applicable to other civilian deaths that have
occurred in military firefights.405 In the event of an unsatisfactory
judicial outcome in the United Kingdom, Mousa’s family and others
should also have recourse to pursue claims against the United
Kingdom before the European Court of Human Rights because it is
a signatory to the European Convention. 
As a policy matter, the extraterritorial application of the
European Convention raises a fundamental question as to the
continued viability of international human rights law:  If a state can
be liable for the commission of a human rights violation within its
own territory, should it not also be responsible for the same act
conducted abroad? It seems anathema to principles of universal
human rights law that a state may be able to commit egregious acts
with impunity abroad and not be required to answer to principles
of international law. In this era of intervention, the European
Convention on Human Rights should extend to those lawless areas
of Europe to provide redress for such violations where obligations
to protect human rights have been ignored, including such areas in
Iraq. 
